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Abstract	
The	fine	is	the	most	common	penalty	imposed	by	courts	of	summary	jurisdiction	in	Australia,	
and	fines	 imposed	by	way	of	penalty	notice	or	 infringement	notice	are	a	multiple	of	those	
imposed	by	 the	courts.	The	 latter	are	being	used	 for	an	 increasing	range	of	offences.	This	
progressive	 ‘monetization	of	 justice’	 (O’Malley	 2009b)	 and	 its	 effects	 have	 passed	 largely	
unnoticed.	The	enforcement	of	 fines	has,	 in	most	parts	of	Australia,	been	passed	from	the	
justice	system	to	government	revenue	agencies	with	barely	any	public	scrutiny	or	academic	
analysis.	 Sentencing	 councils,	 law	 reform	 commissions	 and	 audit	 and	 ombudsman	 offices	
have	completed	inquiries	on	fines,	some	of	them	wide‐ranging	and	highly	critical	of	existing	
arrangements.	 Yet,	 these	 inquiries	 arouse	 little	 public	 or	 media	 interest	 and,	 partly	 in	
consequence,	there	has	been	little	political	will	to	tackle	fundamental	problems	as	distinct	
from	tinkering	at	the	margins.	After	surveying	the	theoretical	literature	on	the	role	of	the	fine,	
this	 paper	 considers	 the	 neglected	 question	 of	 fines	 enforcement.	We	 present	 three	 case	
studies	 from	different	Australian	 jurisdictions	 to	highlight	 issues	associated	with	different	
models	of	enforcement.	We	show	that	fines	enforcement	produces	very	real,	but	often	hidden,	
hardships	 for	 the	 most	 vulnerable.	 Despite	 its	 familiarity	 and	 apparent	 simplicity	 and	
transparency,	the	fine	is	a	mode	of	punishment	that	hides	complex	penal	and	social	realities	
and	effects.	
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Introduction	
The	 fine	 is	 the	most	common	penalty	 imposed	by	criminal	courts	 in	Australia	and	most	other	
high‐income	countries,	with	the	notable	exception	of	the	United	States	of	America	(USA)	(Faraldo‐
Cabana	 2017;	 O’Malley	 2009a).	 Yet,	 no	 penalty	 has	 received	 less	 critical	 examination	 in	 the	
academic	literature.	Fines	being	so	common,	much	attention	is	devoted	to	technical	aspects	of	
their	 administration	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 efficiency.	 Indeed,	 in	 Australia,	 legislative	
modification	of	fines	enforcement	processes	seems	to	be	constantly	in	train.	Sentencing	councils,	
law	 reform	commissions,	 and	audit	 and	ombudsman	offices	have	also	completed	 inquiries	on	
fines,	some	of	them	wide‐ranging	and	highly	critical	of	existing	arrangements	(see,	for	example,	
Audit	Office	of	NSW	2002;	NSW	Law	Reform	Commission	(NSWLRC)	2012;	NSW	Ombudsman	
2009;	 NSW	 Sentencing	 Council	 2006;	 Sentencing	 Advisory	 Council,	 Victoria	 2014).	 Yet,	 these	
inquiries	 arouse	 little	public	 or	media	 interest	 and,	 partly	 in	 consequence,	 there	has	been	no	
political	will	to	tackle	fundamental	problems	as	distinct	from	tinkering	at	the	margins.	Political	
inertia	 is	not	aided	by	 the	paucity	of	academic	 interest,	especially	when	we	compare	 it	 to	 the	
extensive	literature	on	incarceration,	the	most	consequential	penalty	but	one	imposed	in	only	a	
small	minority	of	cases.	
	
Critical	public	interest	in	the	fine	has	mainly	focused	on	the	problem	of	imprisonment	for	default,	
where	an	ostensibly	lenient	penalty	converts	into	a	harsh	penal	outcome	because	the	offender	is	
unable	 or	 unwilling	 to	 pay.	 But	 as	 jurisdictions	 in	 Australia	 and	 elsewhere	 removed	
imprisonment	for	default,	public	interest	in	the	fine	waned.	At	the	time	(1987)	this	occurred	in	
New	 South	 Wales	 (NSW)—largely	 as	 a	 result	 of	 a	 sustained	 political	 campaign	 for	 reform	
following	the	severe	bashing	of	a	young	fine	defaulter	named	Jamie	Partlic	in	a	maximum‐security	
prison—Brown	warned:	
	
….	that	the	struggle	is	a	continuing	one;	that	the	problems	of	imprisonment	for	fine	
default	will	not	 ‘cease’	or	 ‘be	 fixed	up’	with	 the	adoption	of	 a	particular	 reform	
package;	 that	 continual	monitoring	 is	 required;	 that	 various	other	 ‘alternatives’	
and	reforms	will	throw	up	their	own	problems;	…	
	
The	struggle	around	imprisonment	for	fine	default	requires	neither	the	abstract	
demand	for	‘abolition’	nor	the	acceptance	that	any	change	is	an	improvement,	but	
an	 eye	 to	 the	detail,	 a	 knowledge	 of	 the	way	 the	 system	currently	 operates,	 an	
ability	to	recognise	how	changes	 in	one	sector	will	react	or	affect	other	sectors.	
(Brown	1987:	84‐85)	
	
It	 is	well	 past	 time	 to	 heed	Brown’s	warning	 and	 to	 reawaken	 critical	 scholarly	 (and	 public)	
interest	in	the	fine	and	its	impacts.	There	are	at	least	three	reasons	for	doing	so,	quite	apart	from	
simply	redressing	its	long‐standing	neglect	in	the	critical	literature.	
	
First,	use	of	 the	 fine	has	soared	since	the	1980s.	A	crucial	development	has	been	the	growing	
reliance	on	out‐of‐court,	infringement	or	penalty	notice	provisions	as	an	alternative	to	criminal	
prosecution	 for	 a	 constantly	 growing	 number	 of	 offences.	 Little	 is	 known	of	 the	 full	 range	 of	
agencies	 involved	 in	 administering	 these	 regimes,	 of	 their	 policy	 frameworks	 or	 of	 how	 they	
exercise	their	discretionary	powers.	
	
Secondly,	the	human	impacts	on	those	affected	is	 little	understood.	Because	 ‘only’	money	is	at	
stake	rather	than	personal	freedom,	the	assumption	is	too	readily	made	that	fines	are	inherently	
lenient,	making	evidence	of	 its	effects	unnecessary.	Where	mandatory	sentencing	 regimes	are	
highly	 controversial,	 it	 is	 overlooked	 that	 fines	 imposed	 under	 administrative	 fixed	 penalty	
regimes	 (over	 95%	 of	 the	 total),	 are	 mandated	 punishments	 that	 take	 no	 account	 of	 the	
circumstances	of	the	offence	or	the	financial	means	of	the	offender,	 in	addition	to	denying	the	
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individual	 traditional	 procedural	 safeguards	 like	 the	 presumption	 of	 innocence	 and	 a	 court	
hearing.	
	
A	 third	 reason	 for	 devoting	 more	 attention	 to	 fines	 is	 that	 fines	 enforcement	 has	 recently	
undergone	significant	reorganisation	in	many	jurisdictions.	The	changes	are	generally	assumed	
to	be	benign	because	they	effectively	remove	imprisonment	as	an	option	in	the	event	of	default.	
However,	 the	 actual	 impacts	 on	 different	 groups	 have	 received	 limited	 public	 or	 academic	
attention.	Where	enforcement	in	the	past	has	tended	to	be	the	responsibility	of	the	justice	system,	
the	current	trend	has	been	to	transfer	it	to	a	separate	administrative	agency,	with	the	primary	
emphasis	 on	 debt	 recovery.	 Innovative	 measures,	 procedures	 and	 sanctions	 have	 been	
introduced	 in	 response	 to	 long‐standing	 problems	 of	 default	 and	 low	 recovery	 rates.	 These	
processes	 can	 be	 highly	 consequential	 for	 some	 people.	 Their	 administrative	 character	 has	
sheltered	 them	 from	 public	 scrutiny	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 it	 often	 renders	 them	 peculiarly	
insensitive	 to	 the	 hardships	 imposed	 on	 the	 vulnerable.	 Publicly	 accessible	 data	 relating	 to	
enforcement	and	its	impacts	are	also	extremely	limited,	scattered	and	inconsistent.	
	
This	article	is	in	two	parts.	In	the	first,	we	rehearse	the	widely	noted	attractions	of	the	fine	as	a	
penalty,	 summarise	 some	of	 the	data	 indicating	 the	 scale	 and	 growing	use	of	 the	 fine,	 briefly	
survey	 the	 theoretical	 literature	 on	 the	 role	 of	 the	 fine	with	 a	 particular	 focus	 on	 the	 recent	
analysis	 by	 eminent	 Australian	 academic,	 Professor	 Pat	 O’Malley,	 of	 the	 place	 of	 the	 fine	 in	
consumer	societies	and,	finally,	turn	to	the	neglected	question	of	enforcement.	The	second	part	
considers	enforcement	issues	in	detail	by	way	of	three	case	studies	looking	at	different	Australian	
jurisdictions.	
	
PART	1:	Attractions	of	the	fine	
We	use	the	term	‘fine’	to	refer	to	both	court‐based	and	out‐of‐court	financial	penalties.	A	growing	
number	of	offences	are	now	subject	to	infringement	or	penalty	notice	provisions.	These	‘opt‐in’	
measures	imposed	by	police	and	other	agencies	require	the	‘offender’	to	pay	a	nominated	fine	for	
the	 infringement	 in	 question	 or	 elect	 a	 court	 hearing,	 usually	 with	 the	 prospect	 that,	 if	
unsuccessful,	 the	penalty	will	be	 increased	and	court	costs	 incurred.	Nomenclature	relating	to	
these	out‐of‐court	 fines	varies.	 ‘Penalty	notice’,	 ‘infringement	notice’	and	 ‘expiation	notice’	are	
amongst	 the	 terms	 used	 in	 one	 or	 more	 jurisdictions.	 We	 will	 generally	 stick	 with	 the	 term	
‘penalty	notice’	for	convenience,	using	the	other	terms	only	where	it	is	warranted	by	the	specific	
context.	Some	choose	to	distinguish	fines	imposed	by	courts	from	out‐of‐court	fines,	referring	to	
the	former	as	‘penal’	fines	and	the	latter	as	‘regulatory’	fines	or	‘regulatory	penalties’.	We	choose	
not	 to	 make	 any	 clear‐cut	 distinction	 of	 this	 kind.	 The	 main	 reason	 is	 that	 no	 coherent	 or	
principled	 basis	 is	 provided	 in	 Australian	 law	 for	 the	 distinction	 or	 is	 relied	 upon	 to	 guide	
decisions	to	make	newly	created	offences	subject	to	administrative	penalties	or,	what	 is	more	
common,	to	remove	offences	hitherto	dealt	with	by	the	courts	into	penalty	notice	regimes.	From	
what	one	can	tell,	the	actual	penalties	imposed	do	not	necessarily	vary	in	any	consistent	way—
that	 is,	being	necessarily	more	 lenient	 in	 the	case	of	penalty	notices	 than	when	 imposed	by	a	
court—as	might	be	expected.	Nor,	when	 it	comes	 to	enforcement	processes	and	sanctions	 for	
default,	is	any	consistent	distinction	drawn	in	most	of	the	new	state	regimes,	which,	in	some	states	
(like	NSW),	simply	homogenise	the	different	financial	penalties	and	other	fees	(like	court	fees),	
treating	them	as	debt.	
	
Fines	 are	widely	viewed	as	 the	 ideal	penalty,	 a	 simple,	 ‘quick,	 efficient,	 flexible,	 effective,	 and	
cheap	form	of	punishment	...	easily	understood	...	and	readily	adjusted	to	reflect	the	seriousness	
of	the	offence	and	the	circumstances	of	the	offender’	(Sentencing	Advisory	Council,	Victoria	2014:	
9).	 They	 are	 readily	 understood	 as	 imposing	 a	 hardship	 but	 one	 which	 is	 (supposedly)	 not	
excessively	disruptive	to	the	lives	of	wrongdoers.	Unlike	other	penalties,	they	are	also	reversible	
in	the	event	of	error.	Fines	reduce	the	fiscal	burden	on	the	criminal	justice	system	and	the	state	
and,	as	a	source	of	revenue,	may	even	support	other	government	programs	and	services.	These	
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factors	 have	 made	 fines	 popular	 with	 judges,	 magistrates	 (McFarlane	 and	 Poletti	 2007;	
Sentencing	Advisory	Council,	Victoria	2014),	administrators	and	politicians,	and	penal	thinkers	
from	the	English	utilitarian	philosopher	Jeremy	Bentham	to	Pat	O’Malley.	Fines	do	not	intrude	on	
the	general	liberty	of	the	subject	and	tend	to	avoid	or	minimise	the	stigmatising	effects	associated	
with	other	penalties.	
	
As	Pat	O’Malley	(2009b)	argues,	these	qualities	have	enabled	money	penalties	to	assume	a	central	
role	in	the	regulation	of	vast	swathes	of	social	and	economic	life	in	modern	societies.	Should	such	
regulation	be	undertaken	 by	 almost	 any	 other	 imaginable	means,	 he	 suggests,	 it	would	 carry	
prohibitive	 financial,	 and	 politically	 unacceptable,	 costs.	 Court‐administered	 fines	 allow	
expensive,	time‐consuming	legal	procedures	to	be	curtailed,	support	the	extension	of	summary	
proceedings	in	place	of	trial	on	indictment,	often	dispense	with	the	need	for	defendants	to	attend	
court	and	encourage	guilty	pleas.	 Infringement	or	penalty	notice	 regimes	 take	a	vast	 range	of	
offences	out	of	the	courts	entirely,	permitting	mass	violations	to	be	processed	at	low	economic	
and	political	cost.	
	
The	growth	in	use	of	the	fine	
In	their	classic	1939	study	Punishment	and	Social	Structure,	Rusche	and	Kirchheimer	identified	
the	factors	driving	the	growing	ascendancy	of	the	fine	in	the	twentieth	century:	fines	achieved	a	
penal	effect	without	cost	to	the	state;	they	ensured	labour	was	not	removed	from	the	economic	
system;	and	the	state	and	philanthropic	organisations	were	relieved	of	the	burden	of	supporting	
offenders’	families.	They	were,	however,	also	mindful	of	the	difficulties	that	stood	in	the	way	of	
‘the	 full	 rationalization	 of	 the	 penal	 system	 through	 the	 introduction	 of	 fines’	 (Rusche	 and	
Kirchheimer	2009	[1939]:	169),	most	importantly,	the	enforceability	of	fines	against	the	indigent	
and	how	to	maintain	a	semblance	of	equal	justice	if	fines	were	converted	to	imprisonment	in	the	
case	of	those	unable	to	pay.	
	
In	or	out	of	court,	fines	are	now,	and	have	been	for	some	time,	by	far	the	most	frequently	imposed	
penalty	 in	 Australia	 and	 many	 other	 countries.	 Over	 60	 per	 cent	 of	 offenders	 sentenced	 in	
Australian	 criminal	 courts	 each	 year	 receive	 a	 monetary	 sanction	 as	 their	 principal	 penalty	
(Australian	Bureau	of	Statistics	2017).	It	is	rare	for	higher	criminal	courts	to	fine	offenders,	except	
as	a	secondary	penalty,	but	Magistrates	Courts	commonly	impose	fines	for	assaults,	thefts,	drug	
offences,	property	damage	and	public	order	offences	as	well	as	motoring	offences.	The	range	of	
offences	subject	 to	penalty	notice	regimes	 is	also	constantly	growing.	 In	NSW	17,000	offences	
under	approximately	100	legislative	instruments	are	subject	to	penalty	notice	provisions	(NSW	
Sentencing	Council	2006:	76).	In	many	jurisdictions	(including	NSW	and	Victoria)	police	now	also	
have	the	discretion	to	proceed	against	some	theft,	wilful	damage	and	public	order	offences	by	
way	of	penalty	notice	or	what	in	NSW	is	called	a	‘criminal	infringement	notice’	(see,	for	example,	
Criminal	Procedure	Act	1986	(NSW)	s	332	and	Criminal	Procedure	Regulation	2017	(NSW)	Sch	4).	
Equally,	 the	 range	 of	 agencies	 that	 can	 impose	 these	 penalties	 has	 expanded	 and	 the	 digital	
technologies	used	in	the	detection	and	administration	of	violations	(for	example,	speed	cameras,	
red	 light	cameras,	use	of	 iPads	by	public	 transport	officers)	have	become	more	sophisticated,	
contributing	to	the	steep	growth	in	the	number	of	infringements	issued.	This	massive	downward	
classification	of	offences	and	curtailment	of	the	courts’	role	has	largely	escaped	public	notice	and	
has	 been	 the	 subject	 of	 little	 critical	 inquiry	 (see	 Fox	 1995a,	 1995b	 for	 an	 important	 early	
exception	in	the	Australian	context).	
	
Out‐of‐court	fines	are	imposed	on	a	vast	scale	compared	to	court‐based	fines.	Currently	around	
2.8	 million	 penalty	 notices	 are	 issued	 each	 year	 in	 NSW	 compared	 with	 roughly	 120,000	
sentences	of	all	kinds	imposed	by	local	courts.	That	translates	into	more	than	20	penalty	notices	
for	every	sentence	imposed	by	a	NSW	court	(NSWLRC	2012:	1).	In	the	mid‐1990s,	Fox	found	that	
the	ratio	of	infringement	notices	to	all	court‐imposed	penalties	(not	just	fines)	was	7:1	in	Victoria	
(1995a,	1995b).	In	2012‐13,	almost	6	million	penalty	notices	were	issued	in	Victoria	by	over	120	
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different	agencies,	while	there	were	114,000	court‐imposed	fines	(Sentencing	Advisory	Council,	
Victoria	2014:	62).	That	is	a	ratio	of	around	50	penalty	notices	for	every	fine	issued	by	a	court,	
conveying	some	sense	of	the	colossal	growth	in	use	of	out‐of‐court	penalties	in	that	state	since	
the	early	1990s.	Critical	scholarship	on	fines	has	seriously	lagged	behind	their	growth	in	number	
and	significance,	both	over	the	longer	period	of	the	twentieth	century	and	in	the	more	recent	past.	
	
Explaining	the	role	of	the	fine	
In	1983,	Bottoms	pointed	out	that	the	prominent	and	growing	role	of	the	fine	was	one	of	the	most	
‘neglected	features	of	contemporary	penal	systems’	(Bottoms	1983).	He	argued	that	it	was	also	a	
trend	that	sat	uncomfortably	with	the	then	popular	‘dispersal	of	discipline’	thesis.	Fines,	unlike	
community‐based	sanctions,	were	devoid	of	any	supervisory	element	or	normalising	purpose,	yet	
penal	analysis	at	the	time	was	centrally	preoccupied	with	the	net‐widening	effects	of	community	
sanctions,	what	was	depicted	as	an	insidious	extension	of	disciplinary	controls	out	of	the	prison	
and	into	society.	The	dominant	narrative	since	the	1980s	has	emphasised	a	‘punitive	turn’:	the	
return	 to	 centrality	 of	 the	 prison;	 rocketing	 imprisonment	 rates	 in	 many	 countries;	 and	 a	
widening	cultural	shift	in	which	the	overt	hardening	of	penal	policies	and	attitudes	is	driven	by	a	
more	heated,	openly	moralistic	and	emotional	public	discourse	(see,	for	example,	Garland	2001).	
Again,	the	continuing,	indeed	accelerated,	expansion	in	reliance	on	the	fine	since	the	1980s	is	not	
readily	accounted	for	(or	usually	noticed)	in	the	literature	on	the	‘punitive	turn’.	Far	from	‘heating	
up’,	the	fine	as	a	penalty	‘cools’	and	de‐dramatises;	it	drains	punishment	of	emotional	and	cultural	
meaning.	As	Bentham	(1843)	pointed	out	long	ago,	the	fine	lacks	the	element	of	‘exemplarity’,	of	
‘spectacle’,	of	other	punishments.	It	is,	as	he	said,	simply	the	transfer	of	a	monetary	sum	that	has	
nothing	 to	distinguish	 it	 from	other	ordinary	payments.	 This	 is	 a	major	 reason	why	 fines	are	
rarely	 imposed	 by	 higher	 criminal	 courts	 for	 serious	 crimes	 of	 a	 deeply	 personal	 nature	 like	
violent	or	sexual	crimes,	where	putting	a	monetary	value	on	the	offence	appears	to	be	subversive	
of	 cherished	 notions	 of	moral	 personhood	 (Young	 1989).	 It	 also	 helps	 to	 explain	 the	 lack	 of	
attention	accorded	the	fine	in	public	and	academic	discourse.		
	
There	are,	nonetheless,	important	exceptions	to	this	neglect	(Beckett	and	Harris	2011;	Carlen	and	
Cook	 1989;	 Faraldo‐Cabana	 2014,	 2017;	 Fox	 1995a,	 2005b;	 Harris	 2016;	 Harris,	 Evans	 and	
Beckett	2010;	Hogg	1988;	Katzenstein	and	Waller	2015;	O’Malley	2009b;	Young	1989;	and	the	
2011	special	issue	of	Criminology	and	Public	Policy;	for	more	empirical	studies	in	the	Australian	
context,	 see	Brown	et	 al.	2013;	Lansdell	 et	 al.	 2012,	 2013;	 Saunders	et	 al.	2013,	2014;	Walsh	
2005).	
	
In	particular,	Pat	O’Malley	offers	a	refreshingly	original	analysis	of	the	fine	and	other	monetary	
penalties.	 He	 underlines	 the	 absolute	 centrality	 of	 money	 as	 an	 instrument	 of	 contemporary	
governance	 that	 spans	 (and	 blurs)	 the	 traditional	 civil/criminal	 legal	 divide	 which	 has	 set	
boundaries	to	so	much	punishment	and	society	scholarship.	O’Malley	argues	that,	as	‘the	West’	
entered	 its	 post‐war	 age	 of	 affluence,	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 more	 prosperous	 and	 disciplined	
citizenry	delivered	the	conditions	in	which	monetary	penalties	could	assume	the	more	central	
role	envisaged	for	them	by	classical	liberal	thinkers	like	Bentham	and	commended	more	recently	
by	law	and	economics	theorists	 like	Becker	and	Posner	(O’Malley	2011:	550).	With	the	rise	of	
consumer	societies,	money	is	ubiquitous,	the	great	majority	of	people	enjoy	surplus	income	and	
markets	reach	into	nearly	every	pocket	of	existence.	The	problems	identified	in	earlier	times	as	
holding	back	mass	use	of	the	fine—namely,	the	inability	of	the	poor	to	pay	and	the	consequent	
reversion	 to	 some	 other	 penalty	 (usually	 imprisonment)	 for	 defaulters—have	 largely	 been	
overcome.	People	are	led	to	regard	fines	in	much	the	same	light	as	they	do	other	routine	costs	of	
modern	 living	 like	 commodity	 prices,	 taxes,	 licence	 fees,	 tolls,	 and	 so	 on.	 Stripped	 of	 moral	
meaning	or	any	element	of	condemnation,	the	penalty	becomes	literally	just	another	price.	The	
expanding	reliance	on	money	penalties	could,	therefore,	be	seen	to	reflect	a	further	and	important	
dimension	 in	 the	advance	of	neo‐liberal	governmental	 logic	 in	which	market	principles—user	
pays,	efficiency,	cost	recovery—penetrates	the	heartland	of	state	responsibility.	
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Pivotal	to	the	role	of	money	sanctions	is	that,	alone	among	modern	punishments,	they	effectively	
dispense	with	the	requirement	that	the	offender	bear	the	burden	of	the	penalty.	Australian	courts,	
like	courts	in	many	other	countries,	accept	that	it	is	not	wrong	in	principle	to	impose	a	fine	on	the	
basis	that	some	other	party	will	pay	it	(R	v	Repacholi	(1990)).	Jurisdictions	that	reject	this	have,	
nevertheless,	found	it	impossible	to	enforce,	a	necessary	consequence	of	a	penalty	based	on	an	
abstract,	 universal	 medium	 like	 money	 which	 takes	 increasingly	 diverse	 forms	 and	 where	
precisely	 sourcing	 payment	 and	 tracking	 its	 movements	 present	 almost	 insurmountable	
obstacles.	 The	 law	 requires	 payment,	 but	 is	 indifferent	 to	 who	makes	 it.	 Unlike	 other	 penal	
sanctions,	which	are	personal	in	nature,	the	costs	imposed	by	money	sanctions	are	transferable:	
by	having	payment	made	by	another	person	(like	a	family	member)	or	from	pooled	resources	like	
those	of	a	household	or,	in	the	case	of	a	business,	treating	it	as	a	cost	that	is	passed	on	in	the	form	
of	 increased	prices.	The	cost	 is	 transferable	 in	another,	more	 limited,	sense:	 the	offender	may	
borrow	from	another	person	to	pay	or	pay	by	credit	card.	This	converts	the	public	obligation	into	
a	private	contractual	one,	a	private	debt.	This	suggests	the	importance	of	considering	the	nature,	
role	and	impact	of	fines	from	the	standpoint	of	not	only	the	rise	of	consumer	society	but	also	of	
its	perennial	counterpart:	personal	debt.	
	
From	defendant	to	debtor	
O’Malley	stresses	at	the	outset	that	his	analysis	is	primarily	concerned	‘with	money	as	a	tool	or	
technology	of	government—with	how	money	is	imagined	and	intended	to	be	used	rather	than	
with	questions	of	actual	impact	on	the	subjects	of	government’	(2009b:	ix).	His	focus	is	limited,	
therefore,	 and	 not,	 for	 example,	 particularly	 concerned	with	 the	 lived	 experience	 of	 financial	
penalties,	although	it	is	difficult	to	escape	the	impression	that	he	sees	money	penalties	in	largely	
positive	 terms,	what	 he	 refers	 to	 at	 one	 point	 as	 a	 ‘tolerant	 and	 non‐repressive’	 form	of	 risk	
governance	 (O’Malley	 2011:	 550).	 This	 is	 useful	 as	 a	 corrective	 to	 reflex	 dystopian	 forms	 of	
analysis,	but	it	does	rest	on	certain	unexamined	assumptions	about	the	workings	of	fines.	Fines	
may,	as	Bentham	stressed	and	O’Malley	agreed,	avoid	the	element	of	spectacle,	of	‘exemplarity’,	
in	punishment	and	thus	be	less	stigmatising	of	offenders,	but	does	this	mean	they	are	necessarily	
more	 lenient	 in	 their	 effects?	 Could	 it	 be	 that	 this	 feature,	 which	 also	 justifies	 curtailing	
conventional	 legal	 safeguards	 (including	handing	 the	power	 to	punish	 to	 executive	 agencies),	
serves	to	obscure	the	manifold	impacts	of	the	fine?	The	claims	that	fines	are	a	simple,	flexible,	
efficient,	effective	and	inexpensive	penalty	certainly	have	a	surface	plausibility	that	drives	their	
widespread	use,	but	how	far	are	these	advantages	borne	out	in	practice?	Has	a	cosy	complacency	
set	in	around	the	fine	that	obviates	any	felt	need	to	examine	its	workings?	Is	it	regulatory	efficacy	
or	administrative	expedience	that	sustains	commitment	to	the	fine?	
	
It	would	be	foolish	to	deny	that	money	penalties	and	their	unique	transferability	certainly	provide	
pathways	 away	 from	 stigmatising	 entanglement	 in	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 for	 many.	
Alternatively,	this	of	itself	might	be	a	cause	for	concern	where	it	reflects	undue	leniency	towards	
corporations	or	the	wealthy	who	could	be	said	to	escape	‘justice’	simply	because	of	their	capacity	
to	pay.	This	is	a	subject	worthy	of	careful	inquiry,	bearing	in	mind	that	these	parties	are	the	least	
affected	by	financial	penalties,	as	they	are	by	other	forms	of	punishment.	
	
We	do	know	from	research	and	official	 inquiries	 that	 fines	have	disproportionate	and	serious	
adverse	impacts	on	disadvantaged	sections	of	the	community:	Indigenous	Australians,	the	young,	
homeless,	 the	 welfare	 dependent,	 mentally	 ill	 people,	 those	 with	 intellectual	 disabilities	 and	
prisoners.	 These	 groups	are	more	vulnerable	 to	being	 fined	 in	 the	 first	 place	and	 to	accruing	
multiple	fines.	They	are	less	likely	to	be	able	to	pay	fines	or	to	negotiate	the	processes	available	
to	contest	them	or	otherwise	mitigate	their	impact.	Literacy	and	numeracy	problems,	language	
difficulties,	 housing	 insecurity	 and	 residential	 transience	 ensure	 that	 many	 will	 fall	 foul	 of	
inflexible	 administrative	 systems	 that	 are	 insensitive	 to	 the	 circumstances	 of	 the	 poor	 and	
marginal	(official	correspondence	not	received	or	not	understood,	inability	to	provide	relevant	
documentation	 or	 utilise	 on‐line	 systems	 that	 are	 heavily	 dependent	 on	 complex	 forms	 and	
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written	information).	For	the	most	disadvantaged,	criminal	justice	debt	simply	compounds	civil	
debt	 problems	 and	 other	 hardships,	 confronting	 people	 with	 often	 impossible	 choices	 about	
which	bills	to	pay.	Paying	a	fine	will	likely	appear	less	urgent	to	a	household	confronted	with	the	
prospect	of	having	the	electricity	disconnected,	of	not	being	able	to	put	food	on	the	table	or	of	
eviction	 for	 failing	 to	 pay	 rent,	 thus	 requiring	 the	 longer‐term	 consequences	 of	 default	 to	 be	
simply	put	out	of	mind.	Or,	paralysis	or	fatalism	may	set	in	where	people	are	overwhelmed	by	the	
cumulative	stresses	in	their	lives.	To	the	extent	that	fines,	as	debt,	are	transferable	for	the	most	
disadvantaged,	this	may	simply	exacerbate	household	poverty,	tensions	and	conflict.	Involvement	
with	the	criminal	justice	system	may	be	escalated,	whether	through	secondary	offending	(driving	
while	 licence	suspended),	 turning	to	acquisitive	crime	or	due	to	other	 instability	and	disorder	
caused	by	multiple	disadvantage	(drug	and/or	alcohol	problems,	‘sleeping	rough’,	violent	conflict,	
and	 so	 on)	 (Cunneen	 and	 Schwartz	 2009;	 NSW	 Ombudsman	 2009;	 NSW	 Sentencing	 Council	
2006).	 Indigenous	 Australians	 are	 hit	 particularly	 hard	 by	 these	 dynamics	 in	which	 financial	
penalties,	far	from	providing	an	alternative	to	punitive	justice,	are	more	likely	to	afford	pathways	
into	the	punitive	reaches	of	the	system	(Cunneen	and	Schwartz	2009).	A	2008	survey	found	that	
over	40	per	cent	of	the	Aboriginal	community	in	NSW	had	outstanding	debts	with	the	State	Debt	
Recovery	Office	(Elliott	and	Shanahan	Research	2008).	A	NSW	Ombudsman	report	(2009)	found	
that	nine	out	of	ten	Aboriginal	persons	issued	with	a	criminal	infringement	notice	(CIN)	failed	to	
pay	in	time	and	were	referred	for	enforcement.	As	the	NSW	Ombudsman	(2009:	50)	pointed	out,	
‘debts	from	CINs	could	add	to	the	cumulative	stresses	associated	with	poverty	in	communities	
already	struggling	to	cope	with	chronic	debt’.		
	
Because	 fines	as	debt	merge	with	the	other	sources	of	financial	hardship	in	people’s	 lives,	 the	
particular	 impacts	 are	masked.	 They	 are	 frequently	 serious	 and	 potentially	 affect	 quite	 large	
numbers	of	people.	Consider	that	the	2016	Household,	Income	and	Labour	Dynamics	in	Australia	
(HILDA)	Survey	found	over	12	per	cent	of	Australian	households	did	not	have	$500	in	savings	to	
meet	an	emergency	(Wilkins	2016:	85‐86).	Most	fines	imposed	by	NSW	local	courts	are	between	
$200	and	$500	(all	monetary	amounts	in	this	article	are	in	Australian	dollars)	and	penalty	notice	
fines	frequently	exceed	court	fines.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	a	contemporary	capitalist	political	
economy—a	 consumer	 society—runs	 on	 high	 and	 steepening	 levels	 of	 private	 debt,	 growing	
financial	 insecurity	and	the	normalisation	of	precarious	employment	and	economic	conditions	
for	growing	numbers	of	people,	what	Standing	refers	to	as	the	rise	of	the	‘precariat’	(2011).	
	
Sentencing	 principles	 require	 a	 court	 to	 consider	 the	 financial	 means	 of	 an	 offender	 when	
imposing	a	fine	and	to	avoid	imposing	a	fine	that	he	or	she	is	incapable	of	paying,	although	this	is	
commonly	accompanied	by	 the	qualification	 that	 it	 is	only	necessary	when	 the	 information	 is	
reasonably	and	practically	available	(see,	for	example,	Fines	Act	1996	(NSW)	s	6).	The	evidence	is	
that	 various	 factors—caseloads	 and	 workload	 pressures,	 judicial	 attitudes,	 difficulties	 with	
verifying	offender	means—ensure	that	the	sentencing	principle	is	honoured	in	the	exception	by	
the	courts	and	also	that	courts,	from	want	of	knowledge	or	alternatives,	frequently	impose	fines	
on	offenders	who	already	have	outstanding	fines	that	they	cannot	pay	(NSW	Sentencing	Council	
2006:	 45‐48;	 also	 see	Walsh	 2005).	 Of	 course,	 the	 assessment	 of	means	 plays	 no	 role	 in	 the	
imposition	of	the	vast	majority	of	fines	which	are	imposed	by	way	of	penalty	notice.	
	
The	question	of	enforcement	
The	problems	that	restricted	use	of	the	fine	in	earlier	times—especially	its	enforceability	against	
the	 indigent—have	 not	 disappeared,	 but	 this	 has	 not	 inhibited	 its	 growth.	 Claims	 about	 the	
efficacy	of	the	fine	are	belied	by	the	continuing	evidence	of	high	default	rates	and	low	recovery	
rates	(Freiberg	and	Ross	1999:	166;	NSW	Sentencing	Council	2006:	42‐44;	Sentencing	Advisory	
Council,	 Victoria	2014:	 xiii,	 73).	 Fines	may	be	 easy	 to	 impose	but	 getting	people	 to	 pay	 them	
remains	a	major	problem	(Donnelly,	Poynton	and	Weatherburn	2016).	Indeed,	enforcement	has	
necessarily	assumed	growing	significance	as	the	number	and	money	value	of	violations	has	risen	
to	massive	levels.	In	NSW	in	2015‐16,	the	total	value	of	penalty	notices	issued	by	agencies	for	
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which	data	are	published	amounted	to	almost	half	a	billion	dollars.	While	75	per	cent	of	penalty	
notices	and	25	per	cent	of	court	fines	in	NSW	are	finalised	without	further	enforcement	action,	
that	 leaves	cases	numbering	 in	 the	hundreds	of	 thousands	potentially	 subject	 to	enforcement	
action	of	various	kinds.	
	
It	is	an	inescapable	fact	that	the	fine	is	a	fundamentally	inegalitarian	penalty.	Efforts	over	a	long	
period	to	grapple	with	this	(Garton	1982:	102‐103)	only	mitigate	the	impact	of	inequality;	they	
cannot	remove	it.	Measures	seeking	to	address	it	at	source—day	or	unit	fine	systems—present	
other	 problems	 (see	 Ashworth	 2005:	 304‐305)	 that	 have	 prevented	 adoption	 in	 most	
jurisdictions.	In	any	case,	day	and	unit	fine	systems	are	confined	to	the	small	minority	of	fines	
imposed	by	the	courts.	The	inherent	unfairness	is	underscored	by	the	evidence	that	much	default	
stems	 from	 an	 inability	 rather	 than	 an	 unwillingness	 to	 pay	 (Moore	 2003;	 NSW	 Sentencing	
Council	2006:	19‐20,	88‐89;	Walsh	2005).	Abolishing	imprisonment	for	default	has	removed	the	
most	visible	marker	of	unfairness	and	inequity,	but	perhaps	only	to	displace	the	problems	into	
the	more	hidden,	arcane	domains	of	administrative	practice	under	novel	enforcement	systems	
that	produce	their	own	punitive	effects.	
	
The	trend	in	most	Australian	jurisdictions,	and	many	others,	has	been	to	centralise	and	rationalise	
fines	 enforcement	 in	 an	 administrative	 agency	 separate	 from	 the	 justice	 system.	 In	 some	
jurisdictions	(NSW	and	Queensland,	 for	example),	enforcement	responsibility	has	been	passed	
from	the	criminal	 justice	system	 to	 state	 revenue	agencies	 (in	NSW,	Revenue	NSW).	The	core	
emphasis	 is	 on	 ‘risk‐based	 recovery’	 which	 is	 said	 to	 balance	 penal	 concerns	 with	 efficiency	
considerations.	 Graduated	 administrative	 sanctions	 are	 applied	 to	 outstanding	 fines,	 treating	
them	 as	 debts	 and	 sometimes	 assimilating	 them	 to	 other	 forms	 of	 state	 debt.	 ‘Risk‐based	
recovery’—managing	 the	 risk	 of	 non‐payment—has	 subsumed	 the	 risks	 which	 attract	 the	
monetary	penalties	in	the	first	place.	Risks	are	simply	homogenised	as	debt.	The	many	actual	and	
potential	consequences	of	current	enforcement	regimes	are	invisibilised	by	the	logic	of	‘financial	
risk	management’	in	which	defendant	morphs	into	debtor	and	principles	of	justice	(due	process,	
equality,	proportionality,	transparency,	and	so	on)	no	longer	apply.	
	
We	now	turn	to	three	case	studies	relating	to	different	modes	of	enforcement	action	taken	against	
fine	defaulters	in	various	Australian	jurisdictions.	We	show	how	punitiveness	in	different	forms	
is	an	endemic	feature	of	the	new	enforcement	systems.	
	
PART	2	
Case	study	1:	Western	Australia	and	imprisonment	as	a	fines	enforcement	mechanism		
On	 4	 August	 2014,	 a	 young	 Aboriginal	 woman,	 Ms	 Dhu,	 died	 at	 Hedland	 Health	 Campus	 in	
Western	Australia	(WA)	whilst	she	was	in	police	custody.	Ms	Dhu	had	been	imprisoned	for	four	
days	 to	 cut	 out	 fines	 (her	 largest	 being	 $1,000).	 The	 coronial	 inquest	 into	 her	 death	made	 a	
number	 of	 recommendations	 including	 ‘…	 that	 the	 Fines,	 Penalties	 and	 Infringement	 Notices	
Enforcement	Act	 (WA)	(section	53)	be	amended	so	 that	a	warrant	of	commitment	authorising	
imprisonment	is	not	an	option	for	enforcing	payment	of	fines’	(Inquest	into	the	Death	of	Ms	Dhu	
2016:	151).2	Ms	Dhu’s	death	has	been	the	subject	of	widespread	publicity	and	her	mistreatment	
whilst	 in	 custody	 has	 been	 the	 subject	 of	 media	 outrage	 (Brull	 2016;	 Perpitch	 2016),	 of	
community	campaigns	(First	Nations	Deaths	In	Custody	Watch	Committee	Inc	2017),	of	research	
including	into	the	WA	fines	legislation	(Klippmark	and	Crawley	2017;	Porter	2015,	2016)	and	of	
reference	in	government	reports	(Australian	Law	Reform	Commission	(ALRC)	2017a;	Office	of	
the	Inspector	of	Custodial	Services	2016).	
	
As	discussed	in	the	Introduction,	most	criminal	justice	scholarship	has	focused	on	imprisonment.	
It	is	not	surprising,	therefore,	that	a	death	in	custody	when	the	deceased	was	detained	for	fine	
default	is	one	of	the	few	occasions	when	public	interest	is	shown	in	relation	to	fines	enforcement.	
Western	Australia	is	the	only	Australian	jurisdiction	that	does	not	incorporate	the	principle	that	
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imprisonment	 for	 fine	 default	 is	 a	 ‘last	 resort’	 (Sentencing	 Advisory	 Council,	 Victoria	 2014:	
6.3.24).	 Without	 repeating	 the	 focus	 solely	 on	 incarceration,	 this	 case	 study	 considers	 the	
framework	of	the	WA	fines	legislation	in	conjunction	with	important	policy	and	legal	changes	and	
practices	 that	 have	 created	 ‘incentives’	 to	 pay	 back	 fines	 by	 way	 of	 imprisonment.	 Without	
condoning	the	use	of	imprisonment	for	fines	enforcement,	we	nevertheless	raise	concern	over	
the	 failure	 to	 provide	 similar	 incentives	 for	 paying	 back	 fines	 via	 Community	 Service	 Orders	
(CSOs)	 or	 to	 identify	 the	 interrelationship	 with	 other	 forms	 of	 enforcement.	 This	 underlines	
Brown’s	(1987)	argument,	cited	in	the	introduction,	that	we	must	consider	how	changes	in	one	
area	affect	other	parts	of	the	fines	enforcement	system.	
	
WA	fines	system	and	court	fines	enforcement	in	Part	4		
The	 imposition	 and	 enforcement	 of	 fines	 in	 WA	 is	 governed	 by	 the	 Fines,	 Penalties	 and	
Infringement	Notices	 Enforcement	Act	 1994	 (WA)	 (‘the	WA	 Act’)	 and	 the	 Fines,	 Penalties	 and	
Infringement	 Notices	 Enforcement	 Regulations	 1994	 (WA)	 (‘the	 WA	 Regulations’).3	 The	 Act	
distinguishes	enforcement	 for	 court‐imposed	 fines	 from	 those	based	on	 infringement	notices,	
with	only	the	former	being	enforced	by	way	of	imprisonment	(WA	Act	s	29).	Fines	imposed	by	
infringement	 notice	 are	 subject	 to	 civil	 enforcement	measures	 only,	 such	 as	 suspension	 of	 a	
driver’s	licence	or	seizure	of	property	under	a	warrant.		
	
Part	4	of	the	WA	Act	sets	out	the	enforcement	of	court	fines.	A	reading	of	this	Part,	with	the	graded	
hierarchy	of	options	(from	least	to	most	serious)	in	relation	to	default	gives	the	appearance	of	
orderliness	and	fairness.	Thus,	an	offender,	after	receiving	a	fine,	can	pay	it	(s	32(1)(a))	or	apply	
for	 a	 ‘time	 to	 pay	 order’	 (s	 32(1)(b)).	 Where	 the	 offender	 obtains	 a	 time	 to	 pay	 order,	
contravention	may	lead	to	cancellation	of	the	order	and	the	fine	being	‘registered’	(s	36).	Once	
registered,	 the	Registrar	may	 implement	 the	 four‐tiered	enforcement	options:	make	a	 ‘license	
suspension	order’	 (s	42(3)(a));	 issue	an	 ‘enforcement	warrant’	(s	42(3)(b));	 issue	an	order	 to	
attend	for	Work	and	Development	(WDO)	(s	42(3)(c));	and	issue	a	warrant	of	commitment	for	
imprisonment	(s	42(3)(d)).	The	Act	requires	the	enforcement	process	to	follow	this	tiered	system	
(ss	47(2)	and	53(1))	from	least	to	most	serious.		
	
On	its	face,	the	system	thereby	promotes	an	administratively	driven	yet	apparently	‘fair’	series	of	
steps.	 The	 tiered	 options	 also	 suggest	 considerable	 time	 will	 elapse	 before	 a	 warrant	 of	
commitment	(or	WDO)	may	be	contemplated,	giving	the	appearance	that	an	offender	is	afforded	
ample	opportunity	to	make	good	the	debt.	For	example,	the	second	tiered	option,	‘enforcement	
warrant’,	gives	the	Sheriff	statutory	authority	to	undertake	a	number	of	measures	including	the	
seizure	and	sale	of	personal	property	(s	71(2)(b))	and	seizure	of	money	to	apply	to	the	debt	(s	
71(2)(b)),	with	each	step	taking	considerable	time	to	enforce.	Only	failing	this	can	a	WDO	be	used	
(s	 47(2))	 and	 failing	 this	 option	 (for	 example,	 for	 breaching	 the	WDO)	qualifies	 a	warrant	 of	
commitment	for	imprisonment	to	be	used.	This	suggests	that,	even	in	WA,	imprisonment	is	a	de	
facto	mechanism	of	‘last	resort’	for	fines	enforcement.		
	
In	practice,	this	tiered	system	may	be	circumvented	as	the	Registrar	has	an	ultimate	discretion	
under	the	WA	Act	to	implement	the	most	‘effective’	method	of	recovering	the	amount	owed.	This	
discretion	may	be	exercised	on	the	Registrar’s	own	accord	or	as	a	result	of	an	offender	making	
application	under	s	55D.4	An	offender	can	apply	to	convert	the	unpaid	fines	to	Community	Work	
(that	is,	a	WDO5)	or	to	imprisonment.	To	do	so,	the	offender	must	satisfy	the	two	criteria	in	the	
55D	 form:6	 ‘I	 have	 no	 financial	 capacity	 to	 pay’	 and	 ‘I	 have	 no	 assets	 (goods	 or	 property)’.	
Successful	application	allows	the	Registrar	to	avoid	the	otherwise‐required	earlier	enforcement	
steps	(s	47(2)).7	Enquiries	to	the	WA	Fines	Enforcement	Registry	(email	correspondence	with	
Fines	Contact	Centre,	23	February	2016)	confirm	that	an	offender	can	also	apply	for	conversion	
of	unpaid	fines	into	a	term	of	imprisonment.8	For	this	option,	in	addition	to	the	financial/asset	
based	criteria,	 the	offender	 is	 required	 to	be	physically	or	mentally	 incapable	of	 completing	a	
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WDO.	 The	Registrar	 can	 then	 use	 the	 overriding	 discretion	 to	 implement	 the	most	 ‘effective’	
mechanism	under	s	55D.	
	
Leaving	 aside	 the	 extraordinary	 fact	 that,	 where	 an	 offender	 applies	 to	 convert	 the	 fine	 to	
imprisonment,	this	could	see	people	unable	to	work	because	of	mental	or	physical	health‐related	
issues	being	incarcerated,	there	are	two	recent	changes	that	have	meant	conversion	of	fines	to	
imprisonment	may	be	a	more	appealing	option	for	a	fine	defaulter	in	WA.		
	
First,	in	2008	the	then	Labor	Government	introduced	changes	to	the	WA	Act	(specifically	s	58(3))	
which	allowed	imprisonment	terms	for	fine	default	to	be	served	concurrently,	meaning	that	a	fine	
defaulter	will	only	be	imprisoned	for	their	highest	fine.	This	was	not	the	original	intention	of	the	
amendment	 which	 was	 to	 allow	 periods	 of	 imprisonment	 for	 fine	 default	 to	 be	 served	
concurrently	with	sentences	for	other	offences	only,	but	not	concurrently	with	imprisonment	for	
other	 fines	 (see	McGinty	 2006).	 However,	 the	 new	 (and	 current)	 s	 53(8)	 provides	 that:	 ‘The	
period	of	imprisonment	specified	in	a	warrant	of	commitment	is	concurrent	with	any	other	period	
or	term	of	imprisonment	that	the	offender	is	serving	or	has	to	serve	[emphasis	added]’.9	Thus,	the	
terms	are	not	confined	to	terms	of	imprisonment	for	offences	other	than	those	for	fine	default.	
	
In	WA,	an	offender	erases	$250	for	each	day	of	incarceration	(WA	Act	s	53(3)(a);	WA	Regulations	
s	6BAA)	with	a	minimum	period	of	imprisonment	being	one	day	irrespective	of	the	outstanding	
debt	(s	53(3)).	Section	53(3)(a)	in	effect	stipulates	that	the	number	of	whole	days	to	be	served	is	
calculated	by	dividing	the	amount	owed	by	$250	and	then	rounding	down	to	the	nearest	whole	
number	of	days.	For	example,	if	$499	was	owed,	499/250	=	1.996,	which	is	rounded	down	to	one	
day.		
	
In	 this	 context,	 we	 need	 to	 also	 consider	 the	 Registrar’s	 practice	 in	 issuing	 a	 warrant	 of	
commitment.	Our	correspondence	with	the	Fines	Enforcement	Registry	(email	correspondence	
with	Fines	Contact	Centre,	23	February	2016)	confirmed	that	an	individual	warrant	is	created	for	
each	 court	 fine,	meaning	 that	multiple	 fines	 are	 not	 put	 on	 the	 one	warrant.	 Since	 the	 2008	
amendments,	this	means	that	only	the	highest	amount	on	a	warrant	of	commitment	is	required	
to	be	served.	For	example,	if	an	individual	has	10	different	fines,	each	in	the	amount	of	$250,	this	
amounts	to	$2,500	in	total,	a	sum	that	would	take	an	individual	even	in	full‐time	work	a	number	
of	 weeks	 to	 pay	 off.	 However,	 as	 the	 highest	 fine	 is	 $250	 and	 the	 rate	 is	 $250/day	 of	
imprisonment,	it	would	only	take	a	single	day	to	completely	wipe	out	the	totality	of	the	fines.	As	
the	Office	of	the	Inspector	of	Custodial	Services	(2016:	9	[3.8])	indicated,	‘[t]he	benefit	for	fine	
defaulters	serving	time	concurrently	for	multiple	fines	is	that	large	amounts	of	penalties	owed	
can	essentially	be	paid	off	very	quickly.	For	example,	one	woman	served	only	two	days	in	2010	–	
for	over	100	separate	fines	totalling	just	under	$29,000.	Her	largest	fine	was	$844’.	
	
Added	to	these	‘incentives’,	in	2009,	a	more	punitive	policy	for	enforcing	CSOs	was	introduced.	
Prior	to	2009,	a	‘three	omissions	policy’	applied	which	meant	that	an	offender	would	only	breach	
a	CSO	if	s/he	failed	to	report/comply	with	a	CSO	on	three	consecutive	occasions.	For	example,	an	
offender	who	missed	two	consecutive	work	days	but	attended	on	the	 third,	would	technically	
comply	with	the	order	even	though	significantly	delaying	the	completion	of	it.	In	2009	the	policy	
was	modified:	
	
If	a	person	misses	his	community	work	once,	he	receives	a	warning;	and,	if	he	gives	
an	excuse,	it	will	have	to	be	given	within	24	hours.	If	a	person	misses	it	twice—it	
need	 not	 be	 a	 consecutive	 omission—the	 presumption	 will	 be	 that	 he	 has	
breached,	and	he	will	be	sent	back	to	court	for	re‐sentencing.	If	he	misses	it	three	
times,	he	will	know	that	he	will	automatically	be	breached.	(Porter	2009:	4833b‐
4834a)	
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WDOs	fall	under	the	general	policy	for	CSOs.	This	policy	change	appears	to	have	been	a	further	
significant	contributing	factor	in	the	proliferation	of	fine	defaulters	since	2008	choosing	to	enter	
prison	to	cut	out	fines	(Western	Australia	(WA)	Labor	2014).	The	statistics	certainly	demonstrate	
that	this	is	so	(WA	Labor	2014:	5),	with	the	number	of	prison	receptions	for	fine	default	alone	
dramatically	increasing	since	2008:	
	
	 Year	 	 No.	of	receptions	into	Prison	
	 2008	 	 	 		194	
	 2009	 	 	 		666	
	 2010	 	 	 1613	
	 2011	 	 	 1115	
	 2012	 	 	 1127	
	 2013	 	 	 1358	
	
A	more	recent	report	by	the	Inspector	of	Custodial	Services	(2016:	6	[3.4])	qualifies	this	data,	
suggesting	that,	while	receptions	for	fine	default	remain	well	above	2008	levels,	the	number	of	
fine	default	receptions	for	the	financial	year	2014/2015	has	sharply	decreased.		
	
The	impact	of	converting	fines	to	imprisonment	has	overwhelmingly	been	borne	by	women	and	
Aboriginal	people.	In	2013,	one	in	every	three	women	entering	the	prison	system	did	so	solely	to	
clear	 fines	(WA	Labor	2014:	2).	 In	relation	to	Aboriginal	people,	between	2008	and	2013,	 the	
number	incarcerated	for	fine	default	has	increased	from	101	to	590,	a	480	per	cent	growth	(WA	
Labor	2014:	2).	The	number	of	Aboriginal	women	going	to	jail	for	fine	default	has	soared	by	576	
per	cent,	 from	33	 in	2008	to	223	 in	2013	(WA	Labor	2014:	9).	Supporting	 these	 findings,	 the	
Inspector	found	that	‘[f]emales	make	up	approximately	15	per	cent	of	the	total	prison	population	
yet	constitute	22	per	cent	of	the	fine	defaulter	population.	Overall,	women	have	been	consistently	
over‐represented	 in	 the	 fine	 defaulter	 population’	 (Inspector	 of	 Custodial	 Services	 2016:	 12	
[4.2]).	 Further,	 of	 female	 fine	 defaulters,	 the	 majority	 are	 Aboriginal	 (64%)	 (Inspector	 of	
Custodial	Services	2016:	13	[4.3]).	These	are	disturbing	figures	given	that	Aboriginal	people,	and	
Aboriginal	women	specifically,	are	already	heavily	overrepresented	in	the	criminal	justice	system	
(ALRC	2017a).	
	
While	we	have	pointed	to	the	above	legislative	and	policy	changes	that	may	have	led	to	increased	
incarceration	 for	 fine	 default,	we	 know	 little	 about	 the	 individual	 circumstances	of	 these	 fine	
defaulters	and	why	imprisonment	has	become	apparently	a	first	resort.	The	s	55D	form	‘Request	
to	Convert	Court	Fine	to	Imprisonment’	(see	Appendix	1)	provides	little	guidance	on	these	issues	
or	 possibilities	 for	 recording	 relevant	 data.	 The	 form	 requires	 the	 fine	 defaulter	 to	 ‘tick’	
appropriate	 boxes	 out	 of:	 ‘I	 have	 no	 financial	 capacity	 to	 pay’;	 ‘I	 have	 no	 assets	 (goods	 or	
property)’;	 ‘I	 am	 physically	 incapable	 of	 completing	 a	 Work	 and	 Development	 Order’;	 ‘I	 am	
mentally	 incapable	 of	 completing	 a	 Work	 and	 Development	 Order’;	 and	 ‘I	 am	 a	 sentenced	
prisoner/on	remand	at	_______	Prison,	and	my	earliest	release	date	is	__/__/__’.	There	is	no	place	
on	the	form	to	provide	any	detailed	reasons	for	the	application	aside	from	box	ticking.	There	is	
not	even	room	to	indicate	what	type	of	physical	or	mental	incapacity	the	fine	defaulter	suffers.10		
	
We	know	from	the	Inspector’s	Report	(Inspector	of	Custodial	Services	2016)	that	people	with	
‘lower‐paying	 or	 nonprofessional	 jobs	 and	 the	 unemployed	 make	 up	 a	 high	 proportion	 of	
incarcerated	fine	defaulters’	(2016:	14	[4.4]).	 In	relation	to	female	fine	defaulters,	73	per	cent	
were	considered	unemployed	whereas	for	men,	only	10	per	cent	were	considered	unemployed	
(2016,	14	[4.6]).	Furthermore,	52	per	cent	of	Aboriginal	unemployed	fine	defaulters	are	female,	
leading	the	Inspector	to	conclude	that	‘[t]his	evidence	supports	the	notion	of	Aboriginal	women	
historically	 being	 the	 most	 vulnerable	 to	 fine	 default	 imprisonment’	 (Inspector	 of	 Custodial	
Services	2016:	14	[4.7]).	
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While	we	have	little	information	about	the	reasons	why	fine	defaulters,	particularly	Aboriginal	
women,	 are	 choosing	 (or	 being	 forced)	 to	 pay	 off	 fines	 by	 way	 of	 imprisonment,	 we	 note	
interviews	with	three	fine	defaulters	undertaken	by	The	Australian	newspaper	reporters	(Taylor	
and	Laurie	2015).	The	first	accrued	$32,850	in	fines	but	apparently	cleared	the	debt	by	serving	
12	days	in	jail,	after	which	she	accrued	a	further	$30,000	in	fines.	Interviews	with	the	other	two	
women,	 both	 in	 their	 early	 40s	 and	 from	 Perth,	 showed	 that	 ‘they	 share	 care	 their	 children	
whenever	one	or	the	other	goes	to	jail	to	“cut	out”	their	fines’.	One	of	the	women	[Jenny]	spent	
three	weeks	in	prison	for	fines	of	$18,000	for	offences	including	driving	without	a	licence	and	
drink‐driving.	The	Australian	reported:		
	
…	she	did	try	to	complete	20	hours	of	community	service	instead,	but	failed	after	
three	days’	painting	toys	because	of	family	problems	that	she	says	prevented	her	
from	attending	…‘In	a	way	it’s	OK	because	I	don’t	have	that	hanging	over	me	now,’	
Jenny	said.	‘But	I	can’t	get	a	job	because	of	my	record.’	(Taylor	and	Laurie	2015)	
	
Under	s	6A	of	the	WA	Regulations,	converting	fines	to	community	work	occurs	at	the	rate	of	$300	
for	 every	 six	 hours	 worked.11	 The	 offender	 must	 do	 ‘community	 corrections	 activities’	 for	 a	
number	of	hours	as	specified	in	the	WDO	(s	50(1)(a)	of	the	Act)	and	is	required	to	work	12	hours	
per	week	until	the	fine	is	paid	off	(WA	Regulations	s	6A(2)).	There	is	no	legislative	basis	for,	or	
Registrar	practice	of,	concurrently	serving	fines	by	way	of	a	WDO,	unlike	for	imprisonment.	With	
a	$32,850	debt	in	the	case	of	the	first	woman,	she	would	need	to	work	for	657	hours	(or	109	days	
presuming	a	six‐hour	day)	compared	to	the	12	days	in	jail.	In	relation	to	Jenny	with	$18,000	of	
debt,	this	would	amount	to	360	hours	of	work	(60	days	presuming	a	six‐hour	day).	Adding	the	
complications	of	finding	childcare	for	each	day,	a	three‐week	prison	term	may	well	be	an	‘easier’	
option.	 The	 Inspector’s	 finding	 that	 average	 lengths	 of	 imprisonment	 for	 fine	 default	 have	
dramatically	fallen	suggests	this	may	be	so.	The	Inspector	found	that,	before	the	2008	change	to	
allow	concurrent	service	of	fines,	the	average	length	of	prison	term	for	fine	default	was	40	days	
whereas,	after	the	change,	this	decreased	to	an	average	of	4.5	days	(2016:	7	[3.6])	with	22	per	
cent	of	fine	defaulters	being	received	and	released	within	48	hours	(2016:	8	[3.7]).	
	
While	 the	 sample	 of	 women	 interviewed	 by	 The	 Australian	 is	 too	 small	 to	 draw	 any	 firm	
conclusions,	it	highlights	how	different	components	of	the	fines	enforcement	system	may	impact	
upon	other	areas	of	enforcement.	We	note,	in	particular	here,	that	low	conversion	rates	for	fines	
under	a	WDO,	uninspiring	work,	a	more	stringent	policy	for	failing	to	attend	community	work,	
and	potential	difficulties	with	caring	for	children,	may	mean	conversion	via	prison	(particularly	
with	 the	 practice	 of	 serving	 fines	 concurrently)	 is	 a	more	 appealing	 option.	 These	 cases	 also	
suggest	there	are	some	groups	who	are	experiencing	high	levels	of	debt	from	fines	together	with	
recurring	cycles	of	debt	and	enforcement	action.	This	further	underlines	Brown’s	(1987)	point	
that	simply	abolishing	imprisonment	for	fine	default	is	not	a	satisfactory	response	to	the	complex	
issues	raised	by	the	heavy	reliance	on	money	penalties	in	contemporary	justice	systems.		
	
Case	study	2:	Licence	disqualification	and	secondary	offending	in	NSW		
Unlike	WA,	following	the	previously	mentioned	prison	bashing	of	fine	defaulter	Jamie	Partlic	in	
1987	and	subsequent	inquiry,	imprisonment	as	a	primary	response	to	fine	default	was	removed	
in	NSW	(Fines	Act	1996	(NSW)	(NSW	Act)	s	125).	We	would	argue,	however,	that	one	of	the	most	
common	enforcement	mechanisms	used	against	fine	defaulters	today	in	NSW12	has	a	significant	
hidden	punitiveness:	namely,	the	usage	of	mandatory	licence	suspensions	and	cancellations.	It	is	
noteworthy	 that	 the	Partlic	 bashing	was	 the	 impetus	 for	 the	Government	 introducing	 licence	
cancellations	for	unpaid	fines	to	‘replace	the	imprisonment	of	defaulters’	although,	in	its	original	
conception,	this	was	a	principal	sanction	only	against	parking	or	traffic	infringement	default.13	As	
Brown	(1987)	cautioned,	it	should	not	be	accepted	that	any	change	from	imprisonment	for	fine	
default	is	an	improvement	without	understanding	how	those	changes	impact	other	areas.	Given	
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the	 importance	 of	 private	 motorised	 transport	 to	 so	 many	 facets	 of	 daily	 life,	 this	 default	
enforcement	mechanism	is	highly	punitive	and	may	also	be	criminogenic	in	certain	respects.		
	
The	fines	system	in	NSW	
As	with	other	fines	legislation	in	Australia,	the	fines	enforcement	system	in	NSW	is	technical	and	
complex.	It	is	governed	by	the	Fines	Act	1996	(NSW)	and	the	Fines	Regulation	2015	(NSW)	(the	
NSW	 Regulation).	 The	 enforcement	 system	 is	 largely	 administrative,	 not	 court‐based	 or	
supervised	 (aside	 from	 some	 court	 fine	 enforcement	 orders).	 This	 is	 notwithstanding	 how	
consequential	in	various	and	differing	ways	many	of	these	measures	can	be	for	those	affected.	
These	issues	are	compounded	by	the	fact	that	most	fines	are	generated	by	penalty	notices	which	
are	administratively	imposed	in	the	first	place	and	include	mandatory	penalties	which	take	no	
account	 of	 individual	 circumstances,	 capacity	 to	 pay,	 and	 so	 on.	 Furthermore,	 unlike	 the	WA	
enforcement	system,	the	NSW	system	does	not	differentiate	between	court	and	penalty	notice	
fines.	Thus,	 to	 the	extent	 that	 imprisonment	 is	 still	 a	 theoretical	possibility	 in	NSW,	 it	 is	both	
administrative	in	character	and	available	for	fines	not	imposed	by	a	court	(and,	indeed,	for	strictly	
civil	debt	like	outstanding	court	costs).	
	
The	focus	of	this	case	study	is	on	Road	and	Maritime	Services	(RMS)	enforcement	action	by	way	
of	licence	suspension/cancellation	under	Pt	4,	Div	3	of	the	NSW	Act.14	In	NSW,	failing	to	pay	a	fine	
and	continuing	to	default	following	the	service	of	a	penalty	notice	reminder,	may	lead	to	a	penalty	
notice	 enforcement	 order	 being	 issued	 by	 the	 Commissioner	 of	 Fines	 Administration	 (the	
Commissioner)15	(NSW	Act,	ss	40‐45).	Where	default	continues,	this	will	result	in	the	mandatory	
suspension	of	a	driver’s	licence	(NSW	Act,	s	66).	RMS	must	take	this	action	and	it	is	done	without	
further	notice	 to	 a	 fine	 defaulter	 (s	66(1)).	 The	 licence	must	be	 suspended	 even	 if	 a	 grant	 of	
extension	of	time	to	pay	has	been	given	by	the	Commissioner	or	an	instalment	plan	arranged	(s	
66(1A)).	Generally	speaking,	the	licence	is	cancelled	at	the	direction	of	the	Commissioner,	if	the	
fine	remains	unpaid	for	more	than	six	months	(s	66(2)).		
	
It	 should	be	noted	 that	 this	mandatory	 enforcement	mechanism	occurs	 (unlike	 in	 its	 original	
conception)	whether	 the	 default	 relates	 to	 a	 driving	 or	 parking	 offence	 or	 any	 other	 offence	
subject	to	a	penalty	or	infringement	notice.	The	NSW	Legislative	Assembly	Committee	(NSWLAC)	
inquiry	 into	 ‘Driver	 Licence	 Disqualification	 Reform’	 (2013:	 5	 [2.17])	 cited	 diverse	 offences	
leading	to	licence	disqualification	including	failing	to	vote,	not	paying	for	a	fishing	licence,	failing	
to	wear	a	helmet,	or	travelling	on	a	train	without	a	ticket.	In	other	words,	driving	sanctions	are	
not	 related	 to	 driving	 behaviour	 or	 public	 safety	 on	 the	 roads,	 but	 simply	 to	 debt	 recovery.	
According	to	a	report	of	the	NSW	Audit	Office,	driving	sanctions	are	the	most	effective	mode	of	
enforcing	fines	(NSW	Audit	Office	2002).	Yet,	from	the	perspective	of	the	purposes	of	punishment,	
there	 is	no	meaningful	connection	made	between	the	original	offence	(and	management	of	 its	
associated	risks)	and	the	enforcement	sanction	used.		
	
This	enforcement	mechanism	impacts	upon	large	numbers	of	persons.	In	the	first	half	of	2016,	
88,849	 persons	 in	NSW	had	 their	 licences	 suspended	 for	 fine	 default	 (NSW	RMS	 2016).	 This	
exceeded	the	aggregate	of	suspensions	and	cancellations	for	all	other	reasons.	Given	the	reliance	
upon	 driving	 by	many	 people	 for	 employment	 and	 educational	 purposes,	 to	 access	 essential	
services,	 for	 entertainment	 including	 to	 see	 family	 and	 friends,	 and	 to	 undertake	 caring	
responsibilities,	licence	suspension/cancellation	in	and	of	itself	is	highly	punitive.		
	
The	impacts	on	some	communities	are	particularly	harsh.	The	NSWLAC	inquiry	(2013:	10‐17)	
found	 that	 vulnerable	 groups	 (economically	 and	 socially	 disadvantaged	 sectors	 of	 the	
community),	those	living	in	regional,	rural	and	remote	areas,	Aboriginal	communities	and	young	
people	were	most	impacted.	The	NSWLRC	inquiry	(2012)	on	penalty	notices	found	that:		
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…	there	are	some	Aboriginal	communities	in	which	there	may	be	only	one	or	two	
licensed	drivers	and	that	these	drivers	come	under	pressure	to	act	as	‘taxi	drivers’	
to	transport	people	to	essential	appointments.	We	also	heard	about	the	pressures	
on	unlicensed	people	to	drive	unlawfully	(for	example	to	attend	family	funerals	or	
to	transport	sick	children).	Grave	concerns	were	expressed	about	the	number	of	
young	Aboriginal	men	who	are	imprisoned	for	repeated	‘drive	while	disqualified’	
offences,	 and	 about	 the	 consequent	 impact	 of	 imprisonment	 on	 them	and	 their	
families.	(NSWLRC	2012:	378	[16.5])		
	
Close	to	a	quarter	of	Indigenous	appearances	in	NSW	local	courts	are	for	motoring	offences.	The	
number	of	Indigenous	people	sentenced	to	imprisonment	for	driving	while	licence	suspended	or	
disqualified	increased	by	35	per	cent	in	the	first	decade	of	the	century.	They	constituted	over	a	
third	of	all	people	incarcerated	for	that	offence	(Beranger,	Weatherburn	and	Moffat	2010:	3).16		
	
Fines	enforcement	 involves	not	only	a	 form	of	 ‘sentence	creep’,	 in	which	a	supposedly	 lenient	
penalty	for	a	minor	offence	gives	way	to	harsh	sanctions	for	those	who	cannot	pay,	but	is	also	
criminogenic	in	its	effects.	As	was	said	at	the	second	reading	of	the	Fines	Further	Amendment	Bill	
2008:	
	
…	the	imposition	of	a	fine	or	penalty	notice	on	an	already	disadvantaged	person	
simply	opens	the	door	to	an	excessive	interaction	with	the	criminal	justice	system.	
(Hatzistergos	2008)	
	
One	criminogenic	effect	is	‘secondary	offending’.		
	
Secondary	offending	in	NSW	related	to	driving	sanctions	
Secondary	 offending	 in	 NSW	 typically	 occurs	when	 a	 fine	 defaulter	 commits	 another	 offence	
related	to	enforcement	action	taken	to	recover	the	original	outstanding	fine.	This	may	occur	in	
three	main	ways.	First,	if	a	person	has	their	licence	suspended/cancelled	due	to	fine	default	under	
s	66	of	the	Act	and	then	drives	during	the	period	of	suspension/cancellation,	the	driver	commits	
the	offence	of	driving	while	licence	suspended	or	cancelled	under	the	Road	Transport	Act	2013	
(NSW)	s	54(5).17	Secondly,	if	RMS	has	cancelled	the	registration	of	a	fine	defaulter’s	vehicle	for	
failure	to	pay	the	fine	(either	under	s	67(1)	or	at	the	Commissioner’s	direction	under	s	67(2)	of	
the	 Act)	 and	 the	 fine	 defaulter	 then	 drives	 that	 vehicle,	 the	 offence	 of	 using	 an	 unregistered	
vehicle	on	a	road	under	s	68	of	the	Road	Transport	Act	2013	(NSW)	is	committed.	Finally,	while	a	
person	is	not	liable	to	be	committed	to	prison	for	failure	to	pay	a	fine	by	the	due	date	(NSW	Act,	s	
125(1)),	they	are	liable	to	be	committed,	in	accordance	with	the	Act,	for	failure	to	comply	with	a	
CSO	(s	125(2)).		
	
Our	focus	is	on	the	first	form	of	secondary	offending:	namely,	offences	for	driving	while	the	fine	
defaulter’s	 licence	was	suspended	or	cancelled	(DWD).	This	 is	 for	 three	reasons.	First,	since	9	
March	2009,	there	has	been	a	separate	offence	of	drive	while	licence	is	suspended/cancelled	due	
to	non‐payment	of	fines	under	the	Road	Transport	Act	(NSW)	s	54,18	which	enables	us	to	track	
the	 number	 of	 such	 offences	 and	 convictions,	 and	 the	 penalties	 imposed	 for	 this	 particular	
offence.	 Until	 this	 legislative	 amendment	 commenced,	 the	 driving	while	 suspended/cancelled	
offence	in	NSW	did	not	differentiate	based	on	whether	 it	was	due	to	fine	default	or	otherwise	
(Hatzistergos	2008).19	Secondly,	there	is	no	equivalent	separate	offence	for	using	an	unregistered	
vehicle	on	a	road	(s	68	of	the	Road	Transport	Act	(NSW)),	making	it	difficult,	indeed,	impossible	
to	 track	 this	 form	 of	 secondary	 offending.	 Finally,	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 third	 form	 of	 secondary	
offending,	our	 inquiries	(email	correspondence	with	Richard	Cant,	Office	of	State	Revenue,	17	
February	2016)	indicate	that	limited	usage	of	CSOs	has	been	made	in	recent	years,	with	no	CSOs	
issued	prior	to	2002,	and	the	last	issued	in	the	2009‐10	financial	year.	Furthermore,	the	same	
correspondence	indicated	that	no	person	has	been	imprisoned	for	breach	of	a	CSO	since	1996.20	
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Secondary	offending	in	NSW	for	driving	whilst	licence	is	suspended/cancelled		
Given	the	significant	number	of	 licence	suspension/cancellations	in	NSW,	secondary	offending	
has	the	potential	to	affect	a	large	number	of	persons.	Furthermore,	it	has	been	suggested	that	this	
form	of	secondary	offending	is	leading	to	fine	defaulters	being	imprisoned	in	large	numbers	(see	
NSWLRC	2012:	[8.29];	NSW	Department	of	Attorney‐General	and	Justice	2011:	47;	see	also	the	
observations	made	by	the	NSW	Aboriginal	Legal	Service	cited	in	ALRC	2017a:	127	[6.78]).	A	study	
undertaken	by	the	NSW	Bureau	of	Crime	Statistics	and	Research	(BOCSAR)	(Nelson	2015)	for	a	
one‐year	period	(April	2013‐March	2014)	suggests	otherwise.	BOCSAR	found	that,	out	of	the	total	
sample	of	8,874	DWD	charges	finalised	in	the	NSW	Local	Court,	a	total	of	505	people	or	5.7	per	
cent	were	sentenced	to	imprisonment.21	However,	no	people	who	had	been	found	guilty	of	DWD	
due	to	fine	default	were	sentenced	to	a	term	of	imprisonment.	This	was	despite	the	fact	that	a	
total	of	214	people	had	at	least	one	past	DWD	offence	in	the	preceding	five‐year	period.	The	main	
sentence	 issued	 was	 a	 fine	 (1,138)22	 with	 additional	 secondary	 penalties	 of	 licence	
disqualifications	(1,136).		
	
Given	that	the	BOCSAR	study	was	for	only	a	one‐year	period,	we	wanted	to	determine	if	these	
trends	were	consistent	across	the	full	period	since	the	operation	of	the	new	offence	in	2009.	We	
requested,	therefore,	data	from	BOCSAR	for	convictions	in	the	NSW	Local	Court	for	offences	of	
driving	while	suspended/licence	cancelled	from	fine	default,	under	both	s	25A(3A)	of	the	then	
Road	Transport	(Driver	Licensing)	Act	1998	(NSW)	and	the	later	s	54(5)	of	the	Road	Transport	Act	
2013	 (NSW)23	 for	 the	 period	 of	 9	 March	 2009	 (being	 the	 commencement	 of	 s	 25A(3A))	 to	
September	2015,	and	for	the	penalties/sentences	for	these	offences.24		
	
From	the	more	detailed	statistics	provided	by	BOCSAR	we	compiled	Tables	1‐5	(see	Appendix	2).	
What	 these	data	 show	 is	 that	 a	 staggering	10,934	persons	were	 found	guilty	of	DWD	 for	 fine	
default	as	 the	principal	offence	(Table	1).	However,	while	concerns	have	been	raised	that	this	
form	of	secondary	offending	is	leading	to	the	imprisonment	of	fine	defaulters	in	large	numbers,	
like	 the	BOCSAR	study,	our	research	did	not	 find	 this	concern	 justified.25	For	the	period	April	
2009	to	September	2015,	five	people	were	convicted	and	sentenced	to	a	term	of	imprisonment	
when	their	principal	offence	was	DWD	pursuant	to	non‐payment	of	fines	(see	Table	1).	Given	that	
the	 number	 of	 people	 convicted	 of	 the	 offence	 in	 this	 period	 was	 10,934,	 this	 renders	 the	
percentage	of	people	entering	the	prison	system	negligible	(0.046%).	When	combined	with	other	
quasi‐custodial	sentences,26	the	figure	only	increased	to	44,	or	0.4	per	cent	of	those	convicted	
(Table	 4).	 What	 is	 clear,	 however,	 is	 that	 the	 majority	 of	 those	 convicted	 (53.41%	 or	 5,840	
persons)	received	an	additional	fine	(Table	1).		
	
In	 line	 with	 the	 BOCSAR	 study,	 our	 research	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 most	 common	 penalty	
imposed	on	these	offenders	is	a	further	fine.	While	perhaps	the	concern	to	avoid	sentencing	such	
persons	to	incarceration	has	led	to	the	fine	being	the	most	common	sentencing	option,	it	must	be	
remembered	that	this	means	the	court	is	imposing	fines	on	those	who	have	failed	to	pay	their	
original	fine	and	had	their	licence	suspended/cancelled	and	still	not	been	able	to	pay	the	fine	and	
continued	to	drive	whilst	disqualified.	Adding	more	financial	debt	to	those	who	have	failed	to	pay	
their	original	 fine	 is	 clearly	problematic	 and	especially	 so	 if	 these	people	are	 from	 low	socio‐
economic	backgrounds.27	
	
This	problem	is	further	accentuated	if	the	DWD	offence	was	committed	by	the	offender	in	their	
endeavour	 to	avoid	 further	 financial	hardship,	such	as	by	working.	For	 instance,	 the	NSWLRC	
Report	(2012:	[8.26])	noted:	
	
The	 suspension	or	 cancellation	of	 a	driver	 license	may	hinder	a	 fine	 recipient’s	
ability	to	keep	his	or	her	job,	or	to	seek	work,	where	possession	of	a	valid	license	
is	essential.	Thus	license	sanctions	may	aggravate	the	financial	hardship	that	some	
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people	experience	and	which	may	be	the	main	cause	of	their	failure	to	pay	the	fine	
in	the	first	place.	
	
The	Sentencing	Council	has	reported	that	some	people	who	cannot	find	alternative	transport	feel	
that	they	have	to	choose	between	breaking	the	law	by	driving	without	a	valid	licence,	or	losing	
their	job	or	Centrelink	payments	(NSW	Sentencing	Council	2006:	[5.36]‐[5.38]).	This	dilemma	is	
underscored	with	respect	to	those	in	rural	communities	(NSWLRC	2012:	[8.28]).28	
	
It	should	also	be	remembered	that	the	offence	of	DWD	s	54(5)	had	(until	28	October	2017)	an	
associated	 additional	 mandatory	 period	 of	 licence	 disqualification	 (Road	 Transport	 Act	 2013	
(NSW)	 s	 54(8))	 being	3	months	 for	 a	 first	 offence	 and	 two	years	 for	 a	 second	or	 subsequent	
offence:	 s	 54(9).	 These	 driving	 disqualification	 periods	 were	 also	 cumulative	 so	 that,	 where	
someone	had	accumulated	more	than	one	disqualification	period,	they	would	have	to	wait	until	
they	served	the	first	disqualification	period	before	they	started	serving	the	next	one:	s	54(8).	The	
combined	result	was	spiralling	debt	and	lengthy	disqualification	periods,	with	the	court	having	
little	discretion	to	avoid	such	effects,	aside	from	imposing	a	s	10	non‐conviction	order:	Crimes	
(Sentencing	Procedure)	Act	1999	(NSW)	s	10.	
	
A	recent	amendment	to	the	Road	Transport	Act	2013	(NSW)	by	the	Road	Transport	Amendment	
(Driver	Licence	Disqualification)	Act	2017	 (NSW)	(which	commenced	operation	on	28	October	
2017)	may	 reduce	some	of	 these	problems.	The	Amending	Act	 removes	mandatory	minimum	
licence	disqualification	 periods	 for	 a	 variety	 of	 unauthorised	 driving	 offences,	 and	 introduces	
reduced	‘default’	periods	and	‘minimum’	periods	of	disqualification,	the	latter	being	a	period	that	
the	court	may	order	if	‘it	thinks	fit’.	For	a	first	offence	under	s	54(5),	the	default	period	is	three	
months,	but	the	minimum	period	is	only	one	month;	and	for	a	second	or	subsequent	offence	the	
default	period	is	12	months	and	the	minimum	period	is	three	months:	see	now	Road	Transport	
Act	2013	(NSW)	s	205A.	The	Amending	Act	also	makes	licence	disqualification	periods	concurrent	
unless	the	court	orders	them	to	be	cumulative:	s	207A.	Finally,	 the	Amending	Act	reduces	the	
maximum	 penalty	 for	 a	 second	 or	 subsequent	 offence	 under	 s	 54(5)	 from	 two	 years	
imprisonment	to	six	months.	Disappointingly,	however,	given	that	the	most	common	penalty	for	
this	offence	is	a	fine,	the	penalty	unit	maximums	remain	unchanged.		
	
While	it	is	hoped	that	these	amendments	will	have	positive	impacts,	we	would	argue,	as	Brown	
(1987:	85)	did,	that	we	urgently	need	to	have	‘an	eye	for	the	detail,	a	knowledge	of	the	way	the	
system	currently	operates’,	including	information	about	the	background	and	financial	capacity	of	
fine	defaulters	to	pay	these	additional	penalties.	We	need	mechanisms	for	knowing	what	happens	
to	 this	group	of	offenders	 following	 these	additional	 fines	and	 licence	disqualification	periods	
being	incurred,	including	knowledge	of	the	lived	experience	of	such	enforcement	mechanisms.		
	
While	it	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	article,	we	note	that	the	NSWLAC	inquiry	heard	from	the	NSW	
Legal	Assistance	Forum	that	it	was	not	uncommon	for	Forum	Members	to	assist	clients	with	fine	
debt	 exceeding	 $10,000‐15,000	 (NSWLAC	 inquiry	 2013:	 18,	 [3.70])	 in	 relation	 to	 licence	
sanctions	from	fine	default.	The	NSW	Ombudsman	provided	an	example	to	the	NSWLAC	inquiry	
of	an	Aboriginal	man	who	had	$25,000	of	fines	which	would	have	taken	him	30	years	to	pay	off	
on	his	time‐to‐pay	plan	(2013:	19,	[3.71]).	Case	studies	from	the	Homeless	Persons’	Legal	Service	
(2006)	 also	 suggest	 the	 significant	 impact	 of	 fine	 default,	 licence	 disqualification	 and	 DWD	
offences.	 For	 example,	 one	 case	 study	 involved	 a	 teenager,	 Ryan,	 who	 lived	 in	 a	 refuge	 and	
incurred	significant	railway	and	traffic	 fines.	As	he	did	not	pay	them	back,	his	 learner‐driver’s	
licence	was	cancelled.	The	time‐to	pay	arrangement	he	entered	into	meant	that	he	would	not	have	
repaid	his	fines	until	he	was	in	his	30s.	‘Not	surprisingly,	he	gave	up	hope	of	getting	a	licence	and	
started	driving	without	one	…	It	did	not	take	long	to	accumulate	several	years	of	court‐imposed	
disqualifications’	(Homeless	Persons’	Legal	Service	2006:	10).	
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These	examples	illustrate	the	onerous	hidden	impacts	that	fines	enforcement	can	have	on	some	
offenders,	what	amount	to	unfair	and	disproportionate	hardships	on	the	most	vulnerable	inflicted	
without	 appropriate	 safeguards	 or	 mechanisms	 of	 accountability.	 In	 March	 2017,	 in	 part	
recognition	of	 these	problems,	 the	NSW	Act	was	amended	 (by	 the	Fines	Amendment	Act	2017	
(NSW))	to	provide	some	flexibility	to	this	mandatory	system	of	licence	disqualification.	In	s	65	
(that	is,	‘When	enforcement	action	can	be	taken’	under	Div	3)	the	‘Note’	now	provides	that	‘civil	
enforcement	action	can	be	taken	instead	if	the	Commissioner	is	satisfied	that	civil	enforcement	
action	 is	 preferable	 under	 s	71	 [that	 is,	when	 civil	 action	 can	be	 taken]’.	 In	 the	 agreement	 in	
principle	 speech,	 the	 Minister	 for	 Finance,	 Services	 and	 Property	 stated	 this	 amendment	 is	
‘particularly	 applicable	 to	 vulnerable	members	 of	 the	 community	 or	 people	 living	 in	 rural	 or	
remote	locations’	(Dominello	2017).	It	is	too	early	to	tell	what	impact	this	amendment	will	have,	
including	what	other	impacts	the	turn	to	civil	enforcement	will	have	on	such	vulnerable	groups.	
It	is,	however,	pleasing	to	see	that	some	flexibility	in	the	system	may	result.	We	caution,	though,	
that	the	NSW	Act	does	not	indicate	how	the	Commissioner	is	to	be	so	‘satisfied’	that	civil	action	is	
‘preferable’,	nor	how	a	potential	offender	is	able	to	prevent	the	mandatory	licence	suspension	
under	s	66.		
	
Case	study	3:	‘Name	and	Shame’	lists		
The	final	case	study	relates	to	a	less	common	but,	nevertheless,	what	we	believe	to	be	a	punitive	
fines	enforcement	mechanism:	the	use	of	so‐called	‘Name	and	Shame’	lists	for	fine	defaulters.	The	
first	 state	 to	 introduce	 this	 was	 Tasmania	 in	 2008,29	 with	 WA	 following	 in	 201330	 and	 the	
Northern	Territory	(NT)	in	2015.31	While	each	regime	is	different,	essentially,	a	legislative	basis	
is	provided	in	the	relevant	fines	Act	to	publish	the	name	of	a	fine	defaulter	on	a	publicly	accessible	
government	website	following	an	enforcement	order	remaining	unpaid	after	the	28	day	notice	
period.32	The	NT	 legislation	only	allows	publication	 if	 the	unpaid	 fine	 exceeds	$10,000;33	 the	
Tasmanian	and	WA	schemes	do	not	set	minimum	fine	amounts	for	publication	although	the	WA	
scheme	appears	to	in	practice.34	The	Tasmanian	website	is	the	most	extreme,	publishing	not	only	
the	fine	defaulters	name/surname,	suburb	and	the	outstanding	fine	amount	(as	the	WA	and	NT	
sites	do)	but	also	the	full	street	address	and	residing	state	of	the	fine	defaulter.35	The	Tasmanian	
site	publishes	details	of	fine	defaulters	who	owe	as	little	as	$117.36		
	
These	registers	are	designed	to	stigmatise	or	shame	fine	defaulters	into	paying	outstanding	debts.	
These	 sites	 also	 impact	upon	 large	numbers	of	persons,	particularly	 in	Tasmania	and	 the	NT.	
There	are	currently	6,087	persons	named	on	the	Tasmanian	site	(at	1	September	2017),	which	is	
equivalent	 to	 just	over	one	per	cent	of	Tasmania’s	population.	The	NT	site	currently	 lists	560	
persons.37	There	are	100	published	on	the	WA	site,	being	the	top	100	fine	defaulters.		
	
This	form	of	enforcing	fines	works	through	a	different	logic	to	the	classic	understanding	of	the	
fine	 as	 designed	 to	 ‘cool’,	 de‐dramatise	 and	 drain	 punishment	 of	 its	 emotional	 and	 cultural	
meanings	 as	described	 in	Part	1.	 Instead,	 it	 exploits	 classic	 ‘law	and	order’	 (Hogg	 and	Brown	
1998)	punitive	popular	sentiments,	naming,	shaming	and	stigmatising	the	fine	defaulter.	This	‘re‐
individualises’	the	offender	and	restores	the	element	of	spectacle	to	the	penalty.	Members	of	the	
public	 can	 access	personal	details	 of	 fine	defaulters	 (including	 full	 address	on	 the	Tasmanian	
website).	The	fine	defaulter	may	be	further	stigmatised	by	the	media.	In	each	jurisdiction	where	
such	a	scheme	operates,	it	is	common	practice	for	journalists	to	run	annual	stories	about	the	‘top’	
fine	defaulters,	 including	naming	them	and	their	 fines	history	(for	example,	see	Burgess	2014	
(Tas);	Dunlop	2017	(NT);	Hickey	2013	(WA)).		
	
Clearly	 the	 privacy	 invasion38	 and	 stigmatising	 nature	 of	 these	 schemes	 may	 also	 result	 in	
significant	consequences	for	the	fine	defaulter.	The	Tasmania	website	indicates	that:		
	
If	your	name	appears	in	the	published	list,	this	could	have	implications	on	your	
 credit	rating;		
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 ability	to	secure	credit;	
 renting	property;	or	
 otherwise	secure	finance.	
You	should	take	immediate	action	to	resolve	your	monetary	penalties.	
	
We	 would	 add,	 given	 the	 public	 nature	 of	 the	 websites,	 it	 could	 damage	 fine	 defaulters’	
employment	or	prospects	of	employment,	potentially	further	adding	to	the	financial	difficulties	
of	the	fine	defaulter.	
	
Conclusion		
There	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 the	 attractions	 of	 the	 fine	 as	 a	 penalty	 are	 real,	 certainly	 where	 the	
alternative	might	be	imprisonment	or	involve	some	other	intrusive	form	of	supervision	(see	the	
debate	on	the	role	of	the	fine	in	the	USA	in	a	special	issue	of	Criminology	and	Public	Policy	2011).	
Nevertheless,	this	should	not	blind	us	to	the	hidden	and	unfairly	punitive	consequences	of	fines	
for	a	sizeable	minority.	In	addition	to	the	very	real	but	often	hidden	hardships	inflicted	on	the	
most	vulnerable	by	fines	and	by	current	enforcement	arrangements,	it	is	also	of	note	that	efforts	
to	address	endemic	enforcement	problems	are	seeing	the	reappearance	of	other	penal	styles	and	
strategies	via	the	backdoor	of	administrative	process:	for	example,	a	form	of	penal‐welfarism	in	
the	case	of	Work	and	Development	Orders	 in	NSW	and	Queensland	and	naming	and	shaming	
measures	 in	 the	NT,	WA	and	Tasmania.	The	 fine,	 in	 its	apparent	 simplicity,	 transparency	and	
familiarity,	hides	complex	penal	and	social	realities	and	effects	that	are	deserving	of	far	greater	
attention	than	they	have	yet	received.		
	
As	American	anthropologist	David	Graeber	observes	in	his	history	of	debt,	it	is	the	‘very	apparent	
self‐evidence’	of	the	statement	that	‘one	has	to	pay	one’s	debts’	that	makes	it	so	‘insidious	…	the	
kind	of	line	that	could	make	terrible	things	appear	utterly	bland	and	unremarkable	...’	(Graeber	
2012:	4).	The	danger	with	the	growing	monetisation	of	punishment,	the	reduction	of	justice	to	an	
economic	transaction	that	is	precisely	quantifiable,	a	debt	that	is	‘simple,	cold,	and	impersonal’	
(the	qualities	that	make	fines	so	attractive),	is	that	consideration	of	‘needs,	wants’,	‘human	effects’	
are	more	readily	dispensed	with	(Graeber	2012:	13).		
	
With	the	abolition	of	imprisonment	for	fine	default,	public	interest	in	the	manifold	human	and	
social	 consequences	 of	 widespread	 reliance	 on	 fines	 seems	 to	 dissipate.	 The	 historical	 links	
between	debt	and	servitude	are	forgotten.	In	the	past,	debt	was	commonly	used	as	an	instrument	
for	driving	people	into	literal	servility—debt	peonage—and	there	are	latter	day	equivalents	that	
bear	closer	scrutiny.		
	
Today,	fine	defaulters	are	still	finding	their	way	into	prison,	if	by	a	more	circuitous	and	less	visible	
route.	 For	others,	 criminal	 justice	debt	 can	 indeed	amount	 to	 a	modern‐day	 form	of	 servility,	
hanging	over	and	constraining	people’s	lives	for	years	on	end,	as	examples	cited	above	indicate.	
No	matter	the	time	it	takes	or	the	costs	it	imposes,	it	seems,	we	must	all	pay	our	debts.		
	
But,	 in	 all	manner	 of	ways,	 inside	 and	 outside	 the	 justice	 system,	 as	 Graeber	 points	 out,	 ‘the	
principle	has	been	exposed	as	a	flagrant	lie.	As	it	turns	out,	we	don’t	“all”	have	to	pay	our	debts.	
Only	some	of	us	do’	(2012:	391).	The	criminal	justice	system	doesn’t	even	insist	that	all	offenders	
pay	their	debts,	as	long	as	they	are	paid	by	someone.	This	privileges	those	like	large	corporations	
that	can	simply	factor	the	cost	into	pricing	or	transfer	it	in	other	ways.	Elsewhere,	as	we	see	with	
banks	and	other	large	corporations,	with	tax	evasion	by	the	wealthy	and	other	white‐collar	crimes	
involving	vast	financial	sums,	wrongdoers	(when	they	fail	to	wholly	escape	sanction)	generally	
manage	to	negotiate	mutually	agreeable	settlements	away	from	the	moral	gaze	of	the	criminal	
justice	system	and	sheltered	from	the	‘sacred	principle’	requiring	the	honouring	of	all	debts.	
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2	It	is	noted	that,	in	1991,	the	Royal	Commission	into	Aboriginal	Deaths	in	Custody	made	recommendations	
that	imprisonment	be	a	sanction	of	last	resort	(rec.	92)	and	that	sentences	of	imprisonment	should	not	
be	imposed	in	default	of	a	payment	of	a	fine	(rec.	121).	
3	The	Sentencing	Act	1995	(WA)	has	some	relevance	particularly	for	a	fine	defaulter	subject	to	a	Work	and	
Development	Order	 (WDO)	who	must	 comply	with	s	76	of	 that	Act.	This	essentially	 requires	 the	 fine	
defaulter	to	comply	with	reasonable	directions	of	Community	Corrections	in	completing	the	WDO.	If	the	
fine	 defaulter	 breaches	 s	 76	 requirements,	 they	may	 be	 charged	with	 an	 offence	 under	 s	 131	 of	 the	
Sentencing	Act	1995	(WA)	(see	s	77(b)	of	the	Sentence	Administration	Act	2003	(WA)),	which	can	result	in	
up	to	a	$1,000	fine	and	then	Court	discretion	as	to	whether	the	WDO	is	to	remain	on	foot,	or	be	cancelled	
and	different	sentencing	measures	undertaken	(s	133	of	the	Sentencing	Act	1995).	
4	The	Registrar	also	has	specific	discretion	 to	utilise	a	WDO	first	 if	 satisfied	 that	 the	 licence	suspension	
order	and	enforcement	warrant	measures	would	be	fruitless	(s	47A(1)).	For	this	to	happen,	the	Registrar	
must	be	satisfied	of	the	matters	in	s	47A(1)	which	relate	largely	to	the	offender	not	having	the	means	to	
pay	 the	amount	owed/nor	having	equivalent	property	 that	could	be	seized	 to	 cover	 the	debt	and	 the	
person	does	not	hold	a	licence	or	is	licence	disqualified	already.	
5	Noting	that	in	WA	a	WDO	is	a	Community	Service	Order	and	not	akin	to	the	NSW	WDO.	
6	It	is	noted	that	a	s	55D	form	is	not	a	prescribed	form	under	cl	12,	Sch	3	of	the	WA	Regulations.		
7	Such	an	application	and	order	seem	to	be	available	as	soon	as	the	fine	has	been	registered:	ss	55D(1)	and	
45(1).		
8	While	the	conversion	to	imprisonment	form	does	not	appear	to	be	available	through	the	main	webpage	
of	the	Registry,	we	were	able	to	locate	this	form	through	other	means	and	it	is	attached	as	Appendix	1.	
9	Up	until	the	commencement	of	the	new	provisions	on	28	March	2008,	s	53(8)	required	imprisonment	
terms	for	fine	default	to	be	served	‘cumulatively’	with	other	imprisonment	sentences	(historic	version	
Fines,	Penalties	and	Infringement	Notices	Enforcement	Act	1994	(WA)).	
10	This	is	in	contrast	to	the	detail	required	in	relation	to	financial	capacity/assets	on	page	2	of	the	form.	
11	For	example:	
	Fine	Amount	(‘up	to’)	 Hours	required	to	pay	amount	off	
$0	‐	$300		 ‐		 6	hours	
$301‐	$600		 ‐		 12	hours	
$601	‐	$900		 ‐	 18	hours		
12	Most	other	jurisdictions	in	Australia	have	equivalent	mandatory	licence	disqualifications	in	their	fines	
legislation.		
13	 See	 Second	 Reading	 Speech	 to	 Motor	 Traffic	 (Penalty	 Defaults)	 Amendment	 Bill;	 Justice	 (Penalty	
Defaults)	Amendment	Bill;	and	Transport	(Penalty	Defaults)	Amendment	Bill	(Baird	1987:	17025).	
14	An	overview	of	the	fines	enforcement	process	generally	may,	however,	be	found	in	s	58	of	the	NSW	Act.	
15	 The	 Commissioner	 of	 Fines	 Administration	 superseded	 the	 State	 Debt	 Recovery	 Office	 by	 virtue	 of	
amendments	coming	into	effect	on	1	December	2013	(for	the	apparent	purpose	of	greater	efficiency	and	
enforcement),	and	is	entitled	to	use	the	name	‘State	Debt	Recovery’	(s	115	of	the	Act).	State	Debt	Recovery	
falls	under	the	umbrella	department	of	Revenue	NSW	(previously,	the	Office	of	State	Revenue).	
16	A	2011	media	release	issued	by	the	then	NSW	Attorney‐General	relating	to	the	fines	scheme	provided	
background	information	in	which	it	was	noted	that,	in	the	remote	town	of	Boggabilla,	population	of	little	
more	 than	 1000	 people	 (nearly	 all	 Indigenous),	 there	 were	 365	 people	 subject	 to	 driving	 licence	
sanctions,	21	per	cent	for	demerit	points,	33	per	cent	by	way	of	court	disqualification	and	47	per	cent	for	
fine	default.	Given	that	a	proportion	of	the	residents	are	children	or	youth,	this	potentially	amounts	to	
more	than	half	of	the	adult	population	affected	by	licence	sanctions	(Smith	2011).	
17	Road	Transport	Act	2013	(NSW)	which	commenced	on	1	July	2013.	Originally,	the	offence	was	contained	
in	s	25A(3A)	Road	Transport	(Driver	Licencing)	Act	1998	(NSW)	now	repealed.	
18	This	was	inserted	as	s	25A(3A)	into	the	then	Road	Transport	(Driver	Licensing)	Act	1998	(NSW)	which	
carried	over	into	the	current	Road	Transport	Act	2013	(NSW)	as	s	54(5).	
19	 The	 new	 offence	 was	 created	 to	 facilitate	 the	 generation	 of	 statistical	 information	 to	 assess	 the	
significance	of	secondary	offending	following	fine	default	and	to	create	a	distinction	to	allow	sentencing	
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courts	 to	recognise	that	 there	 is	a	 lower	threat	posed	to	 the	community	by	 those	who	have	 lost	 their	
licence	due	to	fine	default	as	opposed	to	losing	their	licence	following	unsafe	driving	practices.	It	is	noted,	
however,	that	s	54	of	the	Road	Transport	Act	2013	(NSW),	provides	an	equivalent	penalty	between	driving	
when	 licence	 is	 suspended/cancelled	 generally	 and	 driving	 while	 licence	 is	 suspended/cancelled	
following	fine	default	(that	being	18	months	imprisonment/30	penalty	units	for	the	first	offence	and	2	
years	 imprisonment/50	 penalty	 units	 for	 subsequent	 offences).	 As	 a	 result,	 there	 appears	 to	 be	
equivalence	in	the	level	of	objective	seriousness	between	the	offences	regardless	of	the	reason	for	the	
original	disqualification	of	the	licence.		
20	Our	correspondence	with	BOCSAR	indicates	there	are	no	records	of	any	person	being	imprisoned	under	
s	87	of	the	NSW	Act	for	such	a	breach.	
21	We	 note	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 a	 proportion	 of	 those	 sentenced	 to	 imprisonment	 for	 driving	while	
disqualified	may	originally	have	lost	their	licence	due	to	fine	default.	This	is	so	for	the	following	reasons.	
If	a	person’s	licence	is	suspended	for	fine	default	and	the	person	then	drives,	s/he	will	have	committed	
an	offence	under	s	54(5).	This	offence	until	October	2017	had	an	automatic	licence	disqualification	period	
which	appears	to	commence	from	conviction.	Any	further	conviction	for	driving	while	disqualified	will	
be	 charged	 under	 s	 53(1).	 It	 is	 then	 possible	 that	 such	 a	 person	 may	 be	 sentenced	 to	 a	 term	 of	
imprisonment	for	the	s	53(1)	offence	or	any	subsequent	such	offences.	See	also	ALRC	2017b:	403,	405.	
(While	there	was	some	doubt	as	to	when	automatic	disqualification	periods	commenced	including	for	s	
54(5)	offences,	a	recent	amendment	to	the	Road	Transport	Act	2013	(NSW)	clarifies	that	any	automatic	
licence	disqualification	period	 for	an	offence	under	s	54	commences	 from	conviction	unless	 the	court	
orders	a	later	date:	see	s	207A	inserted	by	Road	Transport	Amendment	(Driver	Licence	Disqualification)	
Act	2017	(NSW)	which	commenced	operation	on	28	October	2017.	It	is	also	noted	that	this	Amending	Act	
reduced	automatic	disqualification	periods	for	offences	under	s	54,	with	s	205A	now	including	both	lesser	
‘default’	periods	of	disqualification	and	minimum	periods	of	disqualification:	see	s	205A.)	
22	See	Nelson	2015:	7,	Table	4.	
23	The	provisions	of	s	54(5)	and	s	25A(3A)	appear	synonymous,	with	the	same	penalties	for	each	and	nearly	
uniform	wording.	For	the	purposes	of	the	statistical	analysis,	it	made	sense	to	combine	them	as	follows:	
Driving	while	licence	suspended	pursuant	to	s	66	of	the	Fines	Act	(NSW):	s	25A(3A)(a)(i)	=	s	54(5)(a)(i);	
and	 Driving	 while	 licence	 cancelled	 pursuant	 to	 s	 66	 of	 the	 Fines	 Act	 (NSW):	 s	 25A(3A)(b)(i)	 =	 s	
54(5)(b)(i).		
24	We	requested	statistics	to	January	2016	but	the	statistics	provided	were	until	September	2015.	
25	Although	we	note	the	possible	qualification	raised	above	in	endnote	21.	
26	 Namely,	 (1)	 imprisonment,	 (2)	 periodic	 detention,	 (3)	 intensive	 correction	 orders,	 (4)	 suspended	
sentences	and	(5)	community	service	orders.	
27	The	BOCSAR	report	breaks	down	the	DWD	for	fine	default	offenders	into	disadvantage	‘‘quintiles’’	based	
on	 their	 postcode	 area.	 According	 to	 this,	 25	 per	 cent	 of	 offenders	 came	 from	 the	 lowest/most	
disadvantaged	quintile,	however,	11.1	per	cent	came	from	the	least	disadvantaged	quintile	and	23.5	per	
cent	came	from	the	middle	quintile.	Given	that	these	estimations	of	disadvantage	are	based	on	postcode	
alone	however,	 it	 is	difficult	to	determine	their	accuracy	and	what	conclusions	we	can	draw	from	this	
data.	
28	Although	it	is	noted	that	BOCSAR’s	Driving	While	Disqualified	(Nelson	2015:	5,	Table	3)	shows	that	during	
the	April	1	2013	–	March	31	2014	period,	of	the	offenders	for	DWD	following	fine	default,	62.1	per	cent	
came	from	major	cities,	16.3	per	cent	came	from	inner	regional	areas	and	17.7	per	cent	came	from	outer	
regional	 areas,	 with	 a	 total	 of	 96.1	 per	 cent	 not	 deemed	 as	 remote	 or	 very	 remote.	 The	 number	 of	
offenders	from	remote	or	very	remote	areas	was	2.1	per	cent	of	the	total	2,035	offenders.	Given	there	is	
a	majority	of	offenders	located	in	major	cities	or	inner	regional	areas	(79.80%),	this	seems	to	run	contrary	
to	the	argument	made	by	the	Sentencing	Council.	
29	See	Monetary	Penalties	Enforcement	Act	2005	(Tas)	(the	Tas	Act)	Pt	6	‘Administrative	Enforcement’,	ss	
54(1)(g)	and	65.	
30	See	WA	Act,	Pt	5A	‘Publication	of	details	of	persons	on	Registrar’s	website’	(inserted	by	Fines,	Penalties	
and	Infringement	Notices	Enforcement	Amendment	Act	2012	(WA)	Pt.	2).	
31	Fines	and	Penalties	(Recovery)	Act	(NT)	(the	NT	Act)	Div7B	ss	66L‐66N	(inserted	by	the	Fines	and	Penalties	
(Recovery)	Amendment	Act	2015	(NT)).	
32	In	Tasmania,	the	list	is	published	on	the	Department	of	Justice,	Monetary	Penalties	Enforcement	Service	
at	http://www.justice.tas.gov.au/fines/enforcementsanctions/publicationofname;	in	WA,	it	is	on	the	
Department	of	Justice	Courts	and	Tribunal	Services	website	at:	
http://www.courts.dotag.wa.gov.au/_apps/outstandingfines/default.aspx	;	and,	in	the	NT,	it	is	
published	on	the	NT	Government	webpage	at:	https://nt.gov.au/law/processes/fines‐name‐and‐
shame‐list.	
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33	See	NT	Act	s	66L(b)	and	Fines	and	Penalties	(Recovery)	Regulations	(NT)	reg	11A.	
34	 The	 website	 indicates	 that	 the	 list	 contains	 the	 ‘details	 of	 major	 debtors	 registered	 at	 the	 Fines	
Enforcement	Registry’.	An	analysis	of	the	list	(as	at	1	September	2017)	suggests	this	is	so	given	that	the	
‘smallest’	amount	owed	on	the	list	is	$40,902.25	and	the	largest	$273,309.40.		
35	The	WA	legislation	provides	that	such	details	can	be	published	(see	WA	Act	s	56C(a)(iii)),	however,	the	
website	does	not	do	so.	
36	The	highest	fine	recorded	currently	(1	September	2017)	on	the	site	is	$1,226,060.	
37	As	at	I	September	2017.	
38	It	is	noted	that	the	WA	and	NT	schemes	have	protections	for	children	and	those	who	may	otherwise	be	
endangered	by	the	publication	of	name/address	such	as	domestic	violence	victims.	
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